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ABSTRACT 
 
One of the most characteristic features of psychosis is delusional ideation. Delusions 
represent incorrect and inflexible beliefs that are not based on reality. It has been 
proposed that delusions may be secondary to impairments in reality monitoring. These 
systems are formalised in a predictive coding framework, building on Bayesian 
inference theory, that describes the brain as an inference machine. In this framework, 
information processing is conceptualised as a multi-level pyramidal system that shows 
an increasing level of integration. The bottom levels (including primary sensory cortex) 
process simple sensory input while higher levels are associated with information 
processing of increasing complexity. 
 
It has been suggested that in psychosis aberrant salience attribution leads to deficits in 
the lower levels of this hierarchical system, which in turn result in abnormal sensory 
experiences. Moreover, it has been proposed that delusions are formed in order to make 
sense of these unusual experiences that cannot be explained with normal logic.  
 
Overly inflexible beliefs and delusions are not solely manifest in psychotic patients. 
They are also present, to a lesser degree, in the general population. For example, they 
are represented in a personality trait referred to as delusion-proneness. In the work 
presented in this thesis, we decided to study delusion-proneness in a healthy 
population in order to better understand the mechanisms underlying this trait.  
 
Using different paradigms tackling self-recognition, decision making processes, and 
fear learning we confirmed that delusion-prone individuals show behavioural 
impairments similar (but attenuated) to psychotic patients. Taken together, our results 
bring support to the idea that delusion-proneness shows a double dissociation in the 
information processing hierarchy, with high-level prediction systems exerting an 
overly strong influence over imprecise lower-level prediction systems. While delusion-
prone individuals show difficulties in generating low-level expectation signals, they 
tend to integrate more readily higher-order signals (i.e. beliefs) and overly rely on them 
in order to understand their environment. 
 
Our work also points towards an involvement of frontal brain regions, more precisely 
lateral orbito-frontal cortex (lOfc), in the processing of high-order input in delusion-
proneness. Specifically, we found a larger effect of instructions on fear learning in 
delusion-prone individuals than in controls, which was associated with a stronger 
connectivity between lOfc and brain regions involved in fear and pain processing.  
 
Our results also suggest trait co-morbidities between delusion-proneness and sub-
clinical symptoms of Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorders (ADHD), as well as 
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). This argues for a better assessment of these traits in 
studies focusing on psychosis-related states. 
 
While the results presented in this thesis need to be replicated and investigated in a 
clinical population, our studies have helped advance the understanding the 
mechanisms underlying delusion-proneness.   
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I – Introduction  
1) Schizophrenia 
a. Symptoms and evolution of the concept of 
schizophrenia 
 
 
Schizophrenia is a complex, chronic neurodevelopmental psychotic disorder with a 
lifetime morbid risk approaching 1% worldwide (McGrath et al. 2008), and associated 
with devastating consequences for patients and their family. Although conditions and 
symptoms similar to psychosis have been reported since ancient times (Evans et al. 
2003), it was not before the mid-19th century that psychotic symptoms were considered 
forming a disorder entity (for a more detailed review see Tandon et al. 2009). Based on 
longitudinal observations of a large number of clinical cases, Emil Kraepelin (1856 – 
1926) noted that some patients were displaying similar patterns in terms of symptoms 
and illness evolution that would always lead to severe cognitive and behavioural 
impairments. He was the first to group these symptoms previously considered as 
separate, into one single nosological entity he named Dementia Praecox (Kraepelin 
1913).  
Group of catatonic patients, from the fifth edition of Emil 
Kraepelin's Psychiatrie (Leipzig Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1896). 
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Eugen Bleuler (1857 – 1939) refined the description of the disorder, coining the term 
schizophrenia in order to replace Dementia Praecox (Jablensky 2010). While Kraepelin 
supported the concept of a unique disease entity, Bleuler stressed the fact 
schizophrenia was not a disease sensu stricto, but should rather be viewed as a group of 
diseases, due to the large spectrum of symptoms that could be found in those patients 
(Jablensky 2010). Bleuler also made a distinction between what he referred to as basic 
symptoms, used for diagnostic purposes, and accessory symptoms whose presence 
though frequently reported in these patients was not sufficient to give schizophrenia its 
characteristic diagnostic profile (Jablensky 2010). The concept of having some 
symptoms fundamental to the diagnosis of the disease, while others are accessory, 
influenced the way schizophrenia was described the DSM-4 (Pagsberg 2013). 
 
In terms of symptomatology, psychosis is characterised by negative symptoms, positive 
symptoms and disorganisation symptoms (Liddle 1987; Cuesta & Peralta 1995). 
Negative symptoms refer to deficits in mental functions, including social withdrawal, 
poverty of speech, apathy, anhedonia, catatonia (Cuesta & Peralta 1995). Positive 
symptoms, on the other hand are florid manifestations, such as delusions (including 
paranoia) and hallucinations, that reflect aberrant mental activity (Kay et al. 1989; 
Liddle 1987; Cuesta & Peralta 1995). Disorganisation symptoms correspond to a 
fragmentation of normal logical thought process which manifests in speech 
impairments of varying degrees of severity, including incoherence, neologisms, 
derailment, loosening of associations (Covington et al. 2005; Andreasen 1979; Tandon 
et al. 2009). These impairments also translate into the behavioural domain with for 
instance social disinhibition, difficulty in goal-directed behaviours (Tandon et al. 2009). 
More general disturbances are also observed in executive functions (Heinrichs & 
Zakzanis 1998), working memory (Aleman et al. 1999; Silver et al. 2003; Forbes et al. 
2009), and attention deficit (Cornblatt & Keilp 1994; Sullivan et al. 1994; Silverstein et 
al. 2003), which often result in dysfunctions in social adaptation and communication. 
Psychosis is not a mental disorder per se, but an ensemble of symptoms. Schizophrenia 
is a psychiatric disorder that corresponds to a type of psychosis, in which a person must 
present signs of disturbance for at least six months, with psychotic symptoms for at 
least one month, leading to a significant decline in her/his ability to function (Pagsberg 
2013). Moreover, a psychotic episode can be observed during a short period and in 
isolation without any reoccurrence, and can also be part of a bipolar or depressive 
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disorder. In addition, various specific neurological disorders can be associated with 
psychotic symptoms. Finally, many drugs are associated with psychotic symptoms. 
 
There is a substantial comorbidity between schizophrenia and other psychiatric 
disorders. For example, research is increasingly shedding light on symptom overlaps 
between schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorders (ASD) (Stahlberg et al. 2004; 
Chisholm et al. 2015) or attention deficit and hyperactivity disorders (ADHD) (Pallanti 
& Salerno 2015; Stahlberg et al. 2004; Larsson et al. 2013). The concept of 
schizophrenia as a unique disorder with supposedly specific criteria as described in the 
DSM, gets even more questioned when considering that about 5% of ADHD patients and 
8% of individuals with ASD are also meeting criteria for schizophrenia or another 
psychotic disorder (Stahlberg et al. 2004). 
 
The illness time course of schizophrenia shows four distinct phases; a premorbid phase, 
a prodromal phase, a psychotic phase, and a stable phase (Figure 1). Each of them shows 
various degrees of recovery. Interestingly, unlike other neurodevelopmental disorders 
like ADHD or ASD in which the impairments start to be apparent in early childhood, the 
first full-blown psychotic episode rarely occurs before late adolescence or early 
adulthood. Nevertheless, impairments are already present years before this phase. 
 
Childhood is viewed as a premorbid phase (childhood onset schizophrenia is rare 
(Driver et al. 2013)) during which some subtle cognitive, motor, emotion, intellectual 
and behavioural impairments are already often apparent - while no manifest psychotic 
episode has occurred yet (Davidson 2001; Bilder et al. 2006; Woodberry et al. 2008; 
Schenkel & Silverstein 2004). However since the symptoms often remain limited and 
non-specific they are usually unnoticed although it has been suggested that psychotic 
symptoms occur in children and relate to development of schizophreniform disorder in 
adult age (Poulton et al. 2000). Although studies are now trying to identify markers in 
early phases, those subtle and imprecise impairments are often revealed in retrospect, 
after the first psychotic episode. The premorbid phase is followed by a prodromal 
period that takes place right before the first psychotic episode, and can span from a few 
weeks, up to a few years before the onset. In this phase, the cognitive, motor and 
behavioural deteriorations are more dramatic than in the premorbid phase (Ang & Tan 
2004; Nørgaard et al. 2016; Tandon et al. 2009). Sleep disturbances are often observed,  
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as well as perceptual abnormalities, concentration, language and memory impairments 
(Lencz et al. 2006; Fusar-Poli et al. 2012; Lee et al. 2015). Individuals may display  
negative symptoms first (i.e. social withdrawal, depression or anxiety), then transient 
positive psychotic symptoms start to appear. Strong, but imprecise, experiences of the 
world being different than before are common (Kapur 2003).  The frequency and 
intensity of these symptoms increase with time until they reach pre-psychosis or 
subthreshold levels (e.g. pre-delusional thought disturbances, pre-hallucinatory 
perceptual abnormalities) (Larson et al. 2010; Yung & McGorry 1996). Although the 
definition of subthreshold symptoms is arbitrary, these symptoms differ from frank 
psychotic symptoms in terms of severity as well as duration, and importantly, they do 
not require antipsychotic medication (Yung et al. 2005; Larson et al. 2010). While 
partial or complete remission can occur at any stage, even when showing pre-psychotic 
symptoms (Schultze-Lutter 2009; Tandon et al. 2009), the individual may also fall into 
a full-blown psychotic phase, characterised by florid positive symptoms. The first 
psychotic episode is usually the moment when patients seek medical help and get a 
diagnosis. Psychotic phases vary in terms of duration and are usually followed by a 
Figure 1. Evolution of schizophrenia with phases of illness. Reprinted from 
Schizophrenia, “just the facts” 4. Clinical features and conceptualization,  Tandon, R., 
Nasrallah, H. A., & Keshavan, M. S., 1-23, Copyright 2009, with permission from Elsevier. 
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stable period during which positive symptoms attenuate, negative symptoms prevail, 
and functional deteriorations stabilise. While some individuals might only experience 
one psychotic episode, psychotic phases often reappear, and the duration of stable 
phases between two psychotic episodes varies greatly (Tandon et al. 2009). 
 
b. Public health 
 
Patients with schizophrenia need lifelong treatment, and it is frequent to have them 
admitted to hospital inpatient units on several occasions throughout their life. This 
leads to large direct costs in terms of expenditures for hospital and nursing home care, 
community support physicians, drug treatments and appliances. Costs related to lost 
productivity due to morbidity and premature mortality (indirect costs) also have to 
enter the picture. Schizophrenia symptoms are highly disabling, leading to poor social 
functioning and low employment rates (estimated to 10-20% in European countries 
(Marwaha & Johnson 2004)). This represents not only a productivity loss for the 
patients themselves but also for their care-givers who support them with their time and 
different services (Knapp et al. 2004). The resulting total costs for society are therefore 
highly significant. Based on data from 2008, the total annual cost per patient in Sweden 
was estimated to SEK 509,000 (EUR 55,100), with indirect costs accounting for up to 
60% of this total cost (Ekman et al. 2014). Although hard to quantify in monetary terms, 
intangible costs describing the drawbacks of an illness such as pain or depression, 
should also be taken into consideration as they greatly influence indirect costs. 
Mortality is increased by almost 4-fold in those patients, and when looking at suicide 
risk in these patients, it is 8.5-fold greater than in the general population (Harris & 
Barraclough 1997). About a third of schizophrenia patients attempt suicide at least 
once, and 5% of patients die of suicide (Tandon et al. 2009). This risk is actually more 
than 3 times higher at the very beginning of the illness, than at any other time point 
(Palmer et al. 2005; Melle et al. 2006), hence the need to stress the importance of 
directing intervention and prevention efforts towards the early stages of the illness.  
 
c. Other psychosis-related disorders 
 
Although psychosis is a core feature of schizophrenia, it is important to bear in mind 
that it is also part of the symptomatology of other disorders. Psychosis can sometimes 
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manifest itself as a simple delusional disorder, whereby delusional ideation is present 
without any hallucination (Munro 1999). This is the case for instance in paranoia 
(Kendler 1980), delusion of parasitosis whereby patients are convinced their skin is 
infected by insects (Koo & Gambla 1996; Wilson & Miller 1946), or delusion of jealousy 
(also known as Othello syndrome) (Kingham & Gordon 2004; Leong et al. 1994). As 
mentioned previously, psychotic symptoms are also frequently reported in bipolar 
disorder and schizoaffective disorder. Bipolar disorders (or manic-depressive illness) 
correspond to a range of brain disorders causing unusual shifts in mood and energy 
levels, resulting in reduced ability to perform daily tasks (Akiskal & Pinto 1999; 
Hirschfeld et al. 2000). Bipolar disorder type 1 is in fact highly related to schizophrenia, 
genetically (Cardno & Owen 2014; Purcell et al. 2009). Psychosis is also frequently 
observed when these patients go through mood episodes (Pope & Lipinski 1978; Keck 
et al. 2003; Stahlberg et al. 2004). Patients presenting a schizoaffective disorder 
experience a combination of mood symptoms (depression, mania, etc) and 
schizophrenia-like symptoms including hallucinations, delusions, though disorders 
that are not always co-occurring (Pope et al. 1980). Finally, some organic (neurological) 
conditions can also lead to psychotic episodes. They range from neurodegenerative 
disorders (e.g. Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, Frontotemporal dementia) to 
epilepsy, cerebrovascular disease and vascular dementia, multiple sclerosis, brain 
tumour, or head injury (Lautenschlager & Förstl 2001). Although these conditions have 
different origins, they all involve some brain atrophy (either at the cortical level or in 
the limbic system) or imbalance between different neurotransmitter systems 
(Lautenschlager & Förstl 2001; Cummings 1988; Cummings 1992).  
 
d. The concept of psychosis continuum 
 
Despite the fact the notion of prodromal signs in psychosis was already present in 
Bleuler’s work (Jablensky 2010), it was not before the 1960s that researchers started 
to move from a dichotomous conceptualisation of schizophrenia with symptoms being 
either present or absent, to a continuous perspective. Epidemiological and family 
studies began to reveal that psychotic symptoms were observed with different levels of 
severity in patients, and they could also be present at subclinical levels in the general 
population, in particular in patients’ first-degree relatives (McConaghy 1959; Phillips 
et al. 1965; Chapman 1966; Kendler et al. 1993; Kendler et al. 1995). The concept of 
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schizotypy - a personality type presenting with some attenuated features of 
schizophrenia - emerged in the early 1960s (Jablensky 2010; Meehl 1962) and 
schizophrenia got increasingly viewed as “a point on a continuum” (Strauss JS 1969). In 
line with the idea of a prodrome, the dimensional distribution of subclinical symptoms 
has been shown to be linked to a vulnerability to develop a full-blown psychotic 
disorder (Linscott & van Os 2010; Dominguez et al. 2011; Meehl 1989). Due to 
schizophrenia heritability and the presence of subclinical symptoms in the general 
population, the concept of endophenotypes (i.e. stable phenotypes or trait associated 
with a presumed inherited vulnerability, usually identified in a laboratory rather than 
clinical setting (Gottesman & Gould 2003; Braff et al. 2007)) became increasingly 
relevant. The growing interest in finding reliable schizophrenia endophenotypes comes 
from the fact they may help elucidate pathophysiologic mechanisms behind the 
disorder, lead to new treatment development, and may allow early detection (Thaker 
2007; Braff et al. 2007; Allen et al. 2009). However, it is important to stress that the 
presented dimensionality idea does not equal a continuum of psychotic symptoms from 
healthy subjects to patients. Instead, it mirrors how different individuals experience the 
world and relates to the risk of developing a clinical psychotic disorder (van Os et al. 
2009). Many individuals with subclinical psychotic symptoms maintain a good function 
in life, and will never develop a clinical disorder.  It has been suggested that the 
dimensionality of subclinical symptoms is related to specific information processing 
capacities of the individual (i.e. cognitive core capacity (Petrovic & Castellanos 2016). 
The vulnerability associated with the presence of such subclinical symptoms renders 
the study of psychosis-proneness highly relevant. The benefits are two-fold as this 
allows a better understanding of the mechanisms that lead to the transition from non-
clinical levels to psychosis, and also to develop early intervention to prevent this 
transitioning or to limit the extent of negative outcome. It should be noted that the 
categorical approach should not be disregarded as it has practical advantages; it 
facilitates decision-making processes regarding diagnosis and communication among 
clinicians or researchers (Esterberg & Compton 2009). It is also easier to study 
treatment efficacy using a categorical approach (Esterberg & Compton 2009). However, 
one should keep in mind that while a categorical approach may be practical, a 
dimensional approach may be more appropriate when trying to understand 
mechanisms involved in schizophrenia. 
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e. Psychosis-proneness and delusion-proneness 
 
As mentioned above, many core symptoms observed in psychotic disorders can also be 
reported to a lesser degree in healthy individuals. This proneness to psychosis-related 
symptoms is referred to as psychosis-proneness. The cognitive, thought- and 
perceptual mechanisms underlying psychosis-proneness are considered to be similar 
to the one underlying psychosis (Peters et al. 2004; van Os et al. 2009; Teufel et al. 2010; 
Fusar-Poli et al. 2013). Although psychosis-prone individuals have a greater risk to 
develop a frank psychosis, it should be stressed most of them will never develop a 
clinical significant psychotic disorder that includes loss of function (van Os et al. 2009; 
Kaymaz et al. 2012). It should be noted that psychosis-proneness should not be viewed 
as a trait that only bears deleterious aspects. It has been shown to be associated with 
creativity, which might represent an evolutionary advantage (Kyaga et al. 2011; Kyaga 
et al. 2013). Delusion-prone individuals represent an interesting study population as 
they are otherwise healthy and thus free from antipsychotic medications. They do not 
have co-morbidities, and their brain does not present chronic effect related to 
schizophrenia (e.g. cognitive decline). In addition, studying delusion-prone individuals 
might also help understand why certain individuals transition to full-blown psychosis, 
while other never go over that border.  
 
Psychosis-proneness is often studied in terms of delusion-proneness. Delusions are 
defined as erroneous idiosyncratic beliefs (high-level priors), which are not based on 
reality and usually related to misunderstanding or misinterpretation of perceptual 
experiences (Coltheart et al. 2011; Fletcher & Frith 2009). They are characterised by a 
fixed, inflexible nature and patients’ inability to reject implausible beliefs even in the 
face of contradictory evidence (Eisenacher & Zink 2016; Woodward et al. 2008). 
Delusion-proneness is a personality trait describing how prone people are to delusional 
ideation, and that shows a semi-normal distribution in the general population (Peters, 
Joseph, et al. 1999). By definition, delusion-proneness does not necessarily include 
hallucinations. 
 
It should be stressed that delusion-prone individuals are to be differentiated from ultra-
high risk (UHR) individuals. While delusion-proneness represents a trait associated 
with tendencies to psychosis-like experiences, people considered as at ultra-high risk 
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are individuals seeking medical help and showing prodromal signs of schizophrenia 
(Fusar-Poli et al. 2013). The transition rate to frank psychosis for UHR individuals is 
estimated to about 36% in a follow-up period of 3 years (Fusar-Poli et al. 2013). The 
reason why UHR individuals seek medical help in the first place is often related to other 
psychiatric problems like depression, anxiety disorders (Fusar-Poli et al. 2013). An 
important distinction between delusion-prone subjects and UHR is the experienced 
distress caused by the symptoms (Fusar-Poli et al. 2013). 
 
f. Origins 
1. Genetic causes 
 
The neurodevelopmental hypothesis posits that schizophrenia is the result of a process 
spanning over the whole brain development period, and affecting some critical brain 
circuits. Abnormalities can occur as early as late first or second trimester in utero via 
maternal infections (e.g. influenza virus), although the exact mechanisms involved 
remain unclear (Fatemi 2005; Kneeland & Fatemi 2013; Brown 2011; Boksa 2008; 
Brown & Derkits 2010; Jakob & Beckmann 1986). Combined with other factors, these 
early abnormalities may result in the activation of some pathological neural circuits. 
The full-blown consequences appear once the brain reaches its mature state, in late 
adolescence/early adulthood (Fatemi & Folsom 2009). 
 
The question of gender differences in schizophrenia is difficult to address as studies 
report conflicting evidence. The only well-documented gender difference is the age of 
onset. Several studies have reported that men usually develop the illness earlier (mean 
age of the onset 18–25) than women (age of onset 25–35) (Ochoa et al. 2012) (Figure 
2). Several studies have supported the idea of an increased risk for male individuals 
(Aleman et al. 2003; McGrath et al. 2008; Iacono & Beiser 1992; Ochoa et al. 2012). 
Nevertheless, in terms of prevalence the question of gender is still being debated, due 
to the fact some of the results might be due to some methodological shortcomings 
rather than true differences (Häfner 2005).   
 
There is a number of interrelated causes (genetic, neurobiological and environmental) 
underlying schizophrenia spectrum disorders with many stemming back to prenatal 
development as mentioned above. Grey and white matter reductions have been  
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consistently reported in various frontal, temporal and limbic areas in schizophrenia 
patients (Bogerts et al. 1985; Bora et al. 2011; Sigmundsson et al. 2001). Post-mortem 
studies have revealed that the grey matter reduction observed in schizophrenia is 
related to morphological changes in pyramidal neurons rather than neuronal loss. It 
was reported that the soma of pyramidal cells in layer 3 of the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, primary and associative auditory cortices was 10% smaller in schizophrenia 
patients (Glausier & Lewis 2013). Shorter dendrites and a lower density of dendritic 
spines are also thought to contribute to the decreased neuropil observed in 
schizophrenia (Jaaro-Peled et al. 2010; Glausier & Lewis 2013; Iritani 2013). In 
addition, the vast majority of excitatory synapses in the central nervous systems are 
located on dendritic spines. Thus the decrease in these spines may also explain some of 
the neurotransmitter imbalance reported in schizophrenia (Glausier & Lewis 2013). 
Changes in oligodendrocytes and interneurons in terms of cell numbers and gene 
expression have also been reported (Jaaro-Peled et al. 2010). However despite these 
different observations neurobiological causes and molecular mechanisms of 
schizophrenia still remain largely incomplete (Gejman et al. 2010). The fact 
Figure 2. Incidence of schizophrenia by age and gender in England, 1950-2009, pooled 
and per relevant citation. The thin solid and dashed lines present rates of schizophrenia from 
individual studies for men and women, respectively. Thick solid lines present the unweighted 
mean rate for each strata, from these studies. Unweighted means are preferred in this instance 
because no model assumption underpins the data. – Reprinted from Incidence of Schizophrenia 
and Other Psychoses in England, 1950–2009: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analyses. Kirkbride, 
et al. PLOS ONE. 2012. 7(3)  
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schizophrenia presents a complex symptomatology, with patients displaying a variety 
of symptoms, makes the identification of causal genes even more challenging. The large 
interest in genetic factors involved in schizophrenia originated from findings related to 
heritability, showing that the risk for developing schizophrenia is higher if a first-
degree relative has the condition. Children born from two parents with schizophrenia 
have an estimated 46% greater risk for developing the disorder themselves, as 
compared to the 1% lifetime risk in the general population (Combs et al. 2012). 
Genome-wide association studies (GWAS) have been developed in order to identify 
genetic factors involved in the risk of developing schizophrenia. GWAS aim to identify 
in a very large population, genome-wide single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) 
associated with a trait or a disorder, and often summarise the variation in multiple 
genetic loci and their associated weights using a number called polygenic score 
(Dudbridge 2013; de Vlaming & Groenen 2015). So far, the different studies looking at 
polygenic risk profiles for schizophrenia have reported many common variants of very 
small effect when viewed individually, but that collectively form a substantial polygenic 
component of schizophrenia risk when considered collectively (Purcell et al. 2009; 
Henriksen et al. 2017). The cumulative effect was found to account up to a third of the 
total variation in liability (Purcell et al. 2009; Henriksen et al. 2017; Lee et al. 2012; 
Ripke et al. 2013). Today, the limited value of these scores in terms of individual risk 
prediction prevents a clinical application, as diagnostic tools or clinical genetic testing 
for schizophrenia. However, in the future, more refined polygenic scores might prove 
useful in order to assess the risk of schizophrenia in individuals. 
 
Thus, despite family or twin studies reporting high heritability estimates (Gejman et al. 
2010; Sullivan et al. 2003; Kety 1987), researchers have failed to univocally 
demonstrate genetic factors are the sole origin of schizophrenia. Monozygotic twins are 
genetically identical, while dizygotic twins, siblings, and parents share approximately 
50% of their genes. If a phenotype is determined entirely by genetic factors, 
monozygotic twins should show a concordance of 100%, while other first-degree 
relatives (dizygotic twins, siblings, parents) should show a concordance about 50% 
(Tsuang 2000). Existing twin studies have reported concordance rates of schizophrenia 
for monozygotic twins to only approach 40%-50%, thus suggesting genetic factors do 
not fully account for schizophrenia (Tsuang 2000; Insel 2010; Cardno & Owen 2014; 
Gejman et al. 2010). In addition, it should be noted that these figures are slightly 
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overestimated due to some study limitations and the general failure to clearly isolate 
the influence of genetic factors from environmental ones (Kringlen 2000; Gottesman & 
Shields 1976).  
 
2. Environmental and epigenetic causes 
 
Epigenetic changes are induced by the environment in the parents and then transmitted 
to the individual that will develop the disorder (and often relate to what genes are 
expressed and how much they are expressed by various methods such as DNA-
methylation) while environmental changes may directly affect the individual at risk 
(Skinner et al. 2010; Dolinoy et al. 2007). There is a growing body of evidence for the 
role of environmental and epigenetic factors in schizophrenia, showing that individual-
specific environmental effects explain almost 20% of the variance in liability to 
schizophrenia (Cardno & Gottesman 2000; Brown 2011). The ones that have been 
reported the most frequently include various obstetric complications, famines, migrant 
status, seasonal effects (via prenatal infections) and living in an urban area (Gejman et 
al. 2010).   
 
 2.1 Urbanicity 
It has consistently been reported that growing up in urban areas is associated with the 
risk to develop schizophrenia or psychotic disorders (Krabbendam & Van Os 2005; 
Vassos et al. 2012). The idea of a link between an urban environment and schizophrenia 
was first introduced in the late 1930s by Faris and Dunham, who found a much larger 
rate of incidence of schizophrenia (about 6 folds) in the centre of Chicago than in its 
outskirts (Faris & Dunham 1939). The communities living in the inner areas of the city 
were described as more disorganized and unstable, with social isolation and poor 
communication among residents. Although these results were preliminary and possibly 
subjected to several limitations, they sparked some interest in that direction, leading to 
more studies that confirmed those observations. Almost half a century later, Lewis et al 
reported the incidence of schizophrenia was almost 50% higher for men who had had 
an urban upbringing than for those who had been brought up in rural areas (Lewis et 
al. 1992). Using a large cohort (everyone born in Denmark with a known maternal 
identity, between January 1956 and December 1983, and alive by their 15th birthday; 
n=1.89 million people), Pedersen and colleagues found a dose-response relation 
  13 
between urbanicity during upbringing and schizophrenia risk (Pedersen & Mortensen 
2001). Marcelis and colleagues reported that a continuous or repeated urbanicity 
exposure during childhood and adolescence, rather than around or after the onset of 
psychosis, had a risk-increasing effect on psychosis-proneness. In addition, in case of 
subclinical psychosis features in adolescence, growing up in an urban environment 
seems to worsen the outcome consequences of the developmental expression of 
psychosis (Spauwen et al. 2006). The fact urban exposure rather seems to matter 
during upbringing rather than adulthood, also supports the developmental origin of the 
mechanisms involved schizophrenia (Marcelis et al. 1999). However, it should be kept 
in mind that most of the factors linking urbanicity to this increased risk of developing 
schizophrenia remain largely undetermined and hypothetical. Importantly, casual 
relations between urbanicity and development of schizophrenia have not been 
established. Some studies suggest the role of urbanicity per se might have been 
overemphasised, and propose that familial may explain most of the differences of 
schizophrenia prevalence observed between urban and non-urban environments 
(Sariaslan et al. 2015; Sariaslan et al. 2016). 
 
 2.2 Social isolation 
High deprivation and social isolation in the wider social environment (i.e. 
neighbourhood – social network is reported as poorer in cities than in rural areas) have 
been reported as key risk factors (Sundquist et al. 2004). More specifically, social 
capital, defined as “the features of social organisation, such as civic participation, norms 
of reciprocity, and trust in others, that facilitate cooperation for mutual benefit” 
(Kawachi et al. 1997), is increasingly considered as central in the incidence and 
prevalence of mental illness, including neurosis and schizophrenia (McKenzie et al. 
2002; Kawachi et al. 1997). Low-levels of cognitive social capital, mutual trust, bonding, 
safety in neighbourhoods, increased loneliness (Lamster, Lincoln, et al. 2017), 
discrimination and perception of personal injustice (Padhy et al. 2014; Wickham & 
Bentall 2016) are believed to impact dramatically on developmental mechanisms, 
resulting in enhanced emergence of at-risk mental states that may eventually facilitate 
the onset of clinical psychosis in adulthood (Kawachi et al. 1997; Krabbendam & Van Os 
2005). A reduction in loneliness in delusion-prone individuals has actually been 
associated with a reduction in paranoid beliefs (Lamster, Nittel, et al. 2017). Loneliness 
and social exclusion may even have a causal relation to paranoia. Indeed, when 
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combined with cognitive impairment, as observed in schizophrenia, they may lead to 
increased negative and wrong schemata of others, which can easily result in paranoid 
beliefs (Lamster, Lincoln, et al. 2017; Westermann et al. 2012). Patients facing social 
isolation have no other feedback on their experiences than their own distorted beliefs. 
This might play a role in the maintenance of abnormal reasoning (Garety et al. 2001). 
In addition, although a stable and supportive social surrounding might not reduce the 
occurrence of anomalous experiences in patients, it might still help alleviate part of the 
distress and anxiety associated with these events, resulting in better outcome. This is 
supported by studies showing that distress associated with psychosis-like experiences 
(PLE) is a key element when differentiating clinical populations from at-risk 
populations (mainly new religious movement – NRM – populations) (Peters, Day, et al. 
1999; Lim et al. 2011). Indeed, while individuals from NMR or paranormal believers 
report levels of PLE similar to psychotic patients, they are significantly less distressed 
by those experiences than patients (Peters, Day, et al. 1999; Lim et al. 2011; Lim et al. 
2014; Cella et al. 2012). This observation makes sense when one considers the fact 
psychotic patients only receive a diagnosis when they go to a psychiatry ward. It is 
reasonable to think that distress is one of the main factors that would lead someone to 
seek medical help. If PLE or delusions are not particularly distressing, they might have 
a more limited impact on functioning abilities of the person experiencing them. Thus, 
the individual displaying psychotic symptoms might never get a diagnosis. The 
influence of distress on psychosis diagnosis can thus partly explain the protective role 
of social support (Lim et al. 2014; Hultman et al. 1997; Kuipers et al. 2006; Garety et al. 
2001).  
 
 2.3 Drug consumption 
The frequent intake of drugs of abuse also represents a substantial factors in gene-
environmental interactions in the context of psychosis (Radhakrishnan et al. 2014; 
Nielsen et al. 2017; Henquet et al. 2008; Henquet et al. 2005). Although the exact 
mechanisms explaining this effect are still unclear, the general idea postulates that a 
regular cannabis consumption is associated with a greater risk to a full-blown psychotic 
episode (Andréasson et al. 1987; Zammit et al. 2002; Linszen 1994; Henquet et al. 2005; 
Henquet et al. 2008; Radhakrishnan et al. 2014), probably via dopamine sensitisation 
(McDonald & Murray 2000; Radhakrishnan et al. 2014). It is thought that most of 
cannabis psychoactive effects come from delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinoid (THC) 
  15 
(Radhakrishnan et al. 2014; McDonald & Murray 2000). However, cannabis also 
contains cannabidiol (CBD), a cannabinoid that has been shown to have antipsychotic 
properties (Radhakrishnan et al. 2014). Thus, cannabinoid composition of cannabis 
plays a role in its psychotropic effects. However it should be stressed that cannabis is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of psychosis (Kuepper et al. 2010; McDonald 
& Murray 2000). Therefore, it cannot be described as a purely biological cause. 
 
While cannabis consumption appears to be the highest risk factor in terms of drugs of 
abuse, cocaine and amphetamine can also lead to psychosis (Nielsen et al. 2017). 
However, drug-induced psychoses should not be confused with schizophrenia, as they 
do not usually lead to a diagnosis (Bramness et al. 2012). Nevertheless, repeated 
exposure to cocaine or amphetamine (and to a lesser extent alcohol) increases 
vulnerability (Thirthalli & Benegal 2006; Bramness et al. 2012), and their consumption 
by patients worsens psychotic symptoms and renders treatment more difficult 
(Dermatis et al. 1998; Winklbaur et al. 2006). 
 
g. Pathophysiological mechanisms 
 
Identifying the exact pathophysiological mechanisms of psychosis is not an easy task. 
Although several systems and related processes have been suggested to be involved in 
the development of psychosis, findings are still unclear. The dopamine hypothesis is 
probably one of the oldest and most investigated theories. Considering the critical role 
dopamine plays in salience attribution, the well-documented salience dysfunctions in 
schizophrenia (Kapur 2003) support the idea of dopamine as a key neuromodulator in 
schizophrenia.  
 
1. The role of dopamine 
 
Three lines of evidence suggest the involvement of the dopamine system in psychosis 
and schizophrenia. First, researchers’ interest in the role of dopamine in psychosis 
originates from the discovery that antipsychotic drugs were acting as dopamine 
receptor antagonists (Carlsson et al. 1957; Carlsson & Lindqvist 1963). Secondly, it has 
been shown that administration of psychostimulants that induce dopamine release, 
such as amphetamine, leads to an exacerbation of psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia 
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patients (Laruelle et al. 1996), and induces psychotic-like symptoms in healthy 
individuals (Lieberman et al. 1987). More specifically, it is thought that by inducing an 
increase in phasic dopamine firing in the striatum, psychostimulants render striatal 
dopamine transients aberrant and unable to selectively signal relevant stimuli, which 
disrupts the adaptive behavioural response and thus mimics psychotic symptoms or 
worsens existing ones (Maia & Frank 2017; Dela Peña et al. 2015; Wanat et al. 2009). 
Finally, amphetamine-induced dopamine release positron emission tomography (PET) 
studies suggest that schizophrenia patients (Laruelle et al. 1996; Abi-Dargham et al. 
1998; Breier et al. 1997; Abi-Dargham et al. 2004; Weinstein et al. 2017) and psychosis-
prone individuals (Howes et al. 2009; Fusar-Poli et al. 2011; Egerton et al. 2013; 
Woodward et al. 2011) show a more sensitive dopamine system with a heightened level 
of synaptic dopamine. In addition, studies assessing dopamine synthesis by measuring 
the reuptake of a radioactive dopamine precursor analogue (l-[β-11C]DOPA (11C-
DOPA) or 6-[18F]fluoro-L-DOPA (18F-DOPA)) in presynaptic monoaminergic neurons, 
revealed that dopamine synthesis was elevated in schizophrenia patients (Lindström 
et al. 1999; McGowan et al. 2004), first-degree relatives (Huttunen et al. 2008), and at-
risk individuals (Howes et al. 2009). However, striatal receptor levels has not reliably 
show to be different in unmediated patients versus controls (Howes et al. 2012). 
 
A more refined picture of the role of dopamine in psychosis appeared when studies 
identified the separate effects of D1 (predominantly cortical distribution) and D2 
receptors (predominantly subcortical/striatal distribution) in psychosis (Davis et al. 
1991). These studies suggested that schizophrenia was associated with a reduced D1 
transmission in frontal areas, while striatal D2 transmission was increased. Moreover, 
prefrontal dopamine release has shown to be attenuated in patients (Slifstein et al. 
2015). Due to these receptors specific distribution, this led to the development of the 
concept of fronto-striatal dysfunction. The two dopaminergic systems are closely 
connected (Meyer-Lindenberg et al. 2002), and interact in a bidirectional fashion. It has 
been suggested that the prefrontal hypodopaminergia results in an increase in striatal 
dopamine (Howes & Kapur 2009), while at the same time, subcortical 
hyperdopaminergia inhibits prefrontal function in schizophrenia (Kegeles et al. 2010) 
and to some extent in at-risk individuals (Fusar-Poli et al. 2011). It has been 
hypothesised that frontal dopaminergic dysfunction (hypodopaminergia) underlie 
negative and cognitive symptoms (Goldman-Rakic et al. 2004; Slifstein et al. 2015), 
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while conversely, positive symptoms may to a larger extent originate from striatal 
hyperdopaminergia (Davis et al. 1991; Howes & Kapur 2009; Van Der Gaag 2006). 
Interestingly, some studies suggest that compensatory mechanisms that are believed to 
protect psychosis-prone individuals from developing a full-blown psychosis, may do so 
by limiting the upregulation of striatal dopaminergic system in response to frontal 
hypodopaminergia, and thus allowing for greater prefrontal activity (Krummenacher, 
Mohr, et al. 2010; Mohr et al. 2004; Siever & Davis 2004). 
 
2. The role of glutamate and NMDA receptors 
 
One of the weaknesses of the dopamine hypothesis is the fact D2 receptor antagonists 
show poor efficacy when it comes to alleviating negative and cognitive symptoms 
(Frohlich et al. 2014). In contrast, it has been shown that modulation of the glutamate 
system has an effect on both cognition and positive symptoms (Corlett et al. 2011). This 
prompted the development of a hypothesis revolving around the glutamate system and 
psychosis. Glutamate binds to metabotropic receptors and three kinds of ionotropic 
receptors; N-methyl D-aspartate receptors (NMDA-R), kainate receptors, α-amino-3-
hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazolepropionic acid receptors (AMPA-R) (Moghaddam & 
Javitt 2012). The advantage of the glutamate hypothesis in schizophrenia is that it 
provides mechanisms explaining both negative and positive symptoms (Javitt & Zukin 
1991), without actually rejecting the involvement of the dopamine system, as NMDA-R 
are part of brain circuits involved in dopamine release regulation (Ham et al. 2017; 
Javitt 2010). 
 
The role of glutamate has mainly been studied in the context of NMDA as some studies 
revealed that administration of ketamine or phencyclidine (PCP) – two NMDA-R non-
competitive antagonists - could induce psychosis-like symptoms in healthy individuals 
(Krystal et al. 1994; Tang et al. 2015). The psychomimetic properties associated with 
NMDA-R blockade led researchers to develop the idea that disruption of glutamate 
transmission via NMDA receptors might underlie some psychotic symptoms. NMDA-R 
are ionotropic receptor that are activated by glutamate and allow calcium influx into 
nervous cells. At membrane potential a magnesium ion is bound tightly to the receptor 
pore, preventing the entry of any further ions (Blanke et al. 2009). When presynaptic 
glutamate is released in the synaptic cleft, it binds to both NMDA-R and AMPA-R. Upon 
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glutamate binding, AMPA-R open and allow influx of sodium ions leading to a 
membrane depolarisation. If the concentration of released glutamate is large enough to 
create a substantial depolarisation of the postsynaptic membrane, then the magnesium 
ion blocking NMDA-R will be displaced (Cooke & Bliss 2006).  Thus, when high 
concentrations of presynaptic glutamate are delivered on a strongly activated post-
synaptic membrane, then NMDA-R open and calcium ions flow through the channel. 
This mechanism has been associated with the induction of long-term 
potentiation/depression (Frohlich et al. 2014; Blanke et al. 2009; Adams et al. 2013; 
Cooke & Bliss 2006). The binding site of non-competitive NMDA-R antagonists like 
ketamine and PCP is located deep in the receptor channel. By binding to NMDA-R, 
ketamine (or PCP) prevents both the entry of calcium into the cell and the binding of 
glutamate to the receptor (Moghaddam & Javitt 2012). It should be kept in mind that 
glutamate action is not limited to NMDA-R, as it also binds to kainate receptors and α-
amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazolepropionic acid receptors (AMPA-R) 
(Moghaddam & Javitt 2012). The blockade of NMDA-R leads to an accumulation of 
glutamate in the synaptic cleft, increasing glutamate availability to other receptors (in 
particular AMPA-R), and thus enhancing non-NMDA glutamate transmission involved 
in some other pathways (Moghaddam & Javitt 2012).  
 
In addition, NMDA-R dysfunction has also been implicated in dysregulations in gamma 
amino butyric acid (GABA) cortical transmission. NMDA-R are densely distributed on 
GABA interneurons, which have an inhibitory effect on pyramidal neurons (Steullet et 
al. 2016). It was reported that in the presence of ketamine (or PCP) the excitation of 
GABA interneurons is limited, resulting in an increased activity of pyramidal cells 
(Moghaddam & Javitt 2012; Adams et al. 2013). Further supporting these observations, 
a specific subset of GABA neurons (chandelier neurons) in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
have been described in schizophrenia, as presenting a reduced density of GABA 
transporters, possibly linked to the NMDA hypofunction during development (Lewis & 
Lieberman 2000; Ross et al. 2006; Keshavan et al. 2008; Steullet et al. 2016). NMDA-R 
hypofunction thus appears to disrupt the finely regulated inhibitory/excitatory cortical 
balance leading to an excessive excitatory activity due to a lack of inhibition (Lisman et 
al. 2008). It is proposed that this frontal hyperactivity adds “noise” to the system and 
disrupts the ability of cortical neurons to process relevant information, which could 
explain some of the symptoms observed in psychosis (Moghaddam & Javitt 2012). 
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The kynurenine acid hypothesis has been developed as a way to explain the NMDA-R 
hypofunction in schizophrenia. More specifically, it posits that schizophrenia is 
associated with elevated level of kynurenine acid, a naturally-occurring NMDA-R and 
α7-nicotinic receptors antagonist (Erhardt et al. 2017). Elevated concentrations of 
kynurenine acid would thus have direct consequences on cholinergic and glutamatergic 
signalling, as well as indirect effects on dopaminergic pathways (Erhardt et al. 2017), 
similar to the ones described above. The kynurenine pathway is induced by pro-
inflammatory signals, however the origin of this dysregulation in schizophrenia still 
remains unclear (Erhardt et al. 2017). 
 
2) Predictive coding and psychotic 
symptoms 
a. Bayesian framework 
 
When trying to understand and conceptualise how the brain processes perceptions, it 
is crucial to keep in mind that our perceptions and interpretation of the world are not 
solely based on incoming signals from the environment. Instead, and as described by 
the Bayesian brain hypothesis, the brain constantly tries to predict incoming inputs 
based on internal models, also referred to as priors (Friston 2005). This builds on 
Helmholtz’s idea of perception as unconscious inference, which posits that the visual 
system incorporates implicit prior knowledge to incoming signals, in order to make 
sense of the ambiguous images formed on the retina (Kersten et al. 2004). Helmholtz 
realised that retinal images are ambiguous due to variability related to the conditions 
in which they are being perceived (viewpoint, lightning, etc). As a result, depending on 
the angle from which it is perceived, a given object can give rise to several retinal 
images, while different objects can produce a similar retinal image. The brain has to 
make educated guesses in order to try to disambiguate this noisy perception 
(Mamassian & Goutcher 2001; Adams et al. 2004; Mamassian & Landy 2001). Helmholtz 
proposed that the brain applies previously acquired knowledge to this noisy retinal 
image, in order to automatically and unconsciously infer the properties of the object 
forming the image. After a sensory signal has entered the brain, it is compared to pre-
existing expectations (i.e. predictions or priors). In case of a mismatch between the 
incoming input and predictions, an error message is generated, representing the 
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difference between the two signals, and known as the prediction error (PE) (Rao & 
Ballard 1999). In order to resolve this error, the brain will search its “collection” of pre-
existing priors to find which previously encountered stimulus the novel input 
resembles the most. As soon as a suitable match is found, the representations associated 
with this specific prior are applied to the new incoming information. This unconscious 
analogy process allows the brain to not only circumvent the initial ambiguity and thus 
create a stable and meaningful image of the world, but also to generate different 
possible predictions regarding what is most likely going to happen next, in the given 
situation. This influence of prior knowledge over incoming signals is considered to be 
part of top-down processes, while the incoming input is described as bottom-up 
signalling (Kersten et al. 2004; Geisler & Kersten 2002; Kihlstrom  F. 1987; Bar et al. 
2009; Kersten & Yuille 2003). The Bayesian probability theory describes perception as 
a constructive process based on internal/generative models (Friston 2005). If one 
applies Bayes’ formula for inverse inference to the context of visual perception, one gets 
the probability for the object O to be present, given the retinal image (I) (posterior 
probability) 𝑝(𝑂|𝐼) = (
𝑝(𝐼|𝑂)𝑝(𝑂)
𝑝(𝐼)
) , where 𝑝(𝐼|𝑂) is the likelihood of forming (I) given 
the presence of (O), and p(O) is the probability of the presence of (O). Based on this 
formula it then appears that the probability of the object (O) being the cause of the 
present perception is a trade-off between the reliability/precision of the sensory 
evidence and the prior probability p(O) (Kersten et al. 2004). Thus, the more ambiguous 
the image features are, the more biased is the perception towards prior knowledge, and 
conversely, the more precise the sensory input is, the weaker is the influence of priors 
(Kersten & Yuille 2003; Adams et al. 2013) (Figure 3). Some perceptions rely largely on 
priors, for example seeing a human silhouette in the dusk. However, others are rather 
sensory input driven. This is the case when existing priors are either unreliable, or no 
longer suitable in a specific context and need to be updated (Friston 2005). The idea 
that Bayesian processing provides solutions that are optimal in a given situation also 
implies a notion of dynamic processes, allowing a representation to be modified in case 
of changes in the environment. Similarly, priors are not static representations. Instead, 
they result from constant bidirectional interactions with incoming sensory input. 
Previous work has reported that priors that are often referred to as being strong, such 
as the assumption that light comes from above, can easily be overridden by incoming 
input (e.g. incongruent haptic or visual signals) contradicting the idea that light may 
originate from above, when those are more likely to be true in a given situation (Adams 
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et al. 2004; Morgenstern et al. 2011). This highlights the dynamic and adaptive nature 
of priors.  
 
Similar to the idea proposed by Helmholtz, the Bayesian brain hypothesis describes the 
brain as an inference machine that combines prior knowledge with incoming 
information, in order to optimise probabilistic representations of causes underlying 
perceived items. In this framework, information processing is conceptualised as a 
hierarchical or an aggregational pyramidal structure. The base involves processing of 
simple sensory input in primary sensory cortex, moving towards networks associated 
with information processing of increasing levels of complexity/abstraction, in areas 
increasingly distant from sensory input (Taylor et al. 2015; Friston 2010; Friston 2005; 
Mumford 1992). Generative models of the world are created via PE and interactions 
between the different hierarchical levels. The underlying concept is that each 
hierarchical level interacts with the 
levels below and above it.  When an 
incoming sensory input does not match 
the pre-existing expectations, a PE is 
Figure 3. Schema of the influence of 
signal precision on generation of 
posterior belief. Gaussian probability 
distributions representing prior beliefs, 
posterior beliefs, and sensory evidence as 
functions of some hidden (unknown) 
parameter. The width of the distributions 
symbolises their dispersion or variance and 
is the inverse of the associated precision. 
The dotted line represents the posterior 
expectation. The posterior belief is biased 
toward the prior belief or the sensory 
evidence, in proportion to their relative 
precision. As shown here, if the prior belief 
has a larger precision than the sensory 
evidence, the resulting posterior belief 
tends to be closer to the prior expectation 
(top panel). Conversely, the posterior belief 
will be biased towards sensory evidence if 
the precision of sensory evidence increases 
(or fails to be attenuated) (middle panel), or 
the precision of the prior belief decreases 
(bottom panel). Reprinted from Adams, 
Stephan, Brown, Frith and Friston 
Copyright©2013, with permission from 
Frontier Psychiatry 
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generated at the entry level (Friston 2005; Rao & Ballard 1999). The brain first tries to 
resolve it at that level, using feedback from the immediate higher level (top-down 
influence of priors). If this attempt fails, the residual PE is transmitted, in a bottom-up 
fashion, to the next higher level where a more complex prior is used to try to reduce the 
PE signal. This process continues until the PE is successfully minimised (Rao & Ballard 
1999). This implies that a given level can be both a source of bottom-up signalling 
(sending PE to the next higher level) and a source of top-down signalling (sending 
feedback/priors to the level below) (Sterzer et al. 2016). For simplification purposes, 
in terms of processing complexity low-level hierarchies usually refer to primary 
sensory cortices; i.e. the initial entry level of sensory information. The higher up in the 
network the signal is moving forward along this hierarchy, the more complex and 
integrated is the processing systems.   
 
An example of how the Bayesian brain hypothesis may be applied to the experience of 
reality is the experience of the self (Seth 2013; Apps & Tsakiris 2014). Self-recognition 
relies on the ability to experience a border between the self and the external world. The 
conscious experience of one’s own body in relation to the external world is thought to 
depend on two main, closely intertwined, cognitive components: the sense of body-
ownership (the feeling of inhabiting/experiencing one’s own body) and the sense of 
agency (the subjective awareness that one is initiating, executing, and controlling one's 
own volitional actions in the world) (Tsakiris et al. 2007; Jeannerod 2003). Both are 
considered automatic, non-conceptual signals, relying on an interplay between bottom-
up sensory input and top-down low-level bodily representations (Klaver & Dijkerman 
2016; Tsakiris 2016). Unexpected stimuli may bear threats to the organism’s integrity. 
Therefore, from an evolutionary/survival point of view, experiences that can be 
predicted are less relevant than surprising events (Blakemore et al. 1998). Put simply, 
since the brain’s processing resources are limited, unpredictable stimuli should be 
prioritised over predictable signals in order to have an efficient processing system. 
Thus, being able to differentiate self-generated, and therefore predictable, from 
externally generated elements is crucial.  
 
 The idea that the brain uses motor predictions in information processing started in the 
1950s with the work on the visual system by Sperry (Sperry 1950), and Von Holst and 
Mittelstaedt (von Holst & Mittelstaedt 1950; Holst & Mittelstaedt 1971). Those studies 
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suggested that the brain can correct for the movement of the eyes when experiencing 
visual input by using predictions - leading to a stable visual experience of the external 
world. More recently, it has been suggested that the brain uses predictions to attenuate 
the sensory experience based on sensory input that is internally produced when 
moving (Pynn & DeSouza 2013; Niziolek et al. 2013; Feinberg 1978; Blakemore, 
Wolpert, et al. 2000; Shergill 2003). Thereby, self-produced touch can be differentiated 
from externally induced sensory input – a phenomenon that explains why it is hard to 
tickle oneself (Blakemore, Wolpert, et al. 2000). In more detail, the hypothesis suggests 
that when the brain decides to execute a movement, it sends a motor command to the 
motor system and an sensory prediction of the action to sensory cortex (Ford & 
Mathalon 2005). The motor command sent to the motor system leads to the movement 
execution, while the signal sent to the corresponding sensory cortices (the so-called 
efference copy or corollary discharge) allows the brain to predict the sensory 
consequences of upcoming movements and thus to alter its response to the associated 
feedback (Figure 4). The processing of predicted incoming signals is attenuated, 
allowing the brain to use more resources to surprising events. Due to the importance of 
motor predictions in these mechanisms, a functional low-level prediction system is key 
in the experience of self-recognition. It should be noted that in addition to the predicted 
sensory consequences of a movement, the movement initiation also generates an 
intention component, which is 
crucial in the emergence of a sense 
of agency.  
 
 Similarly to the sense of agency, 
body ownership (the feeling that 
one’s body belongs to oneself - e.g. 
“this is my hand” - and the sense 
that other objects/bodies do not) 
require a functional prediction 
system as it relies on internal body 
representations (body map) that 
act as low-level top-down 
modulators (Tsakiris 2016; Klaver 
& Dijkerman 2016). 
Figure 4. Mechanisms involved in motor 
execution. Reprinted from The function of efference 
copy signals: Implications for symptoms of 
schizophrenia, Pynn L & DeSouza, J, 124-133, 
Copyright©2003, with permission from Elsevier 
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b. Psychosis and the prediction system 
 
As mentioned earlier, schizophrenia is a severe clinical condition that presents a wide 
range of symptoms, out of which psychotic symptoms are most characteristic. Although 
the mechanisms underlying delusions and hallucinations are still unclear, a growing 
body of evidence points towards impairments in brain systems dealing with 
perceptions and expectations. More specifically, it seems that a change in the top-
down/bottom-up balance of information processing is at the core of psychotic 
symptoms (Adams et al. 2013; Fletcher & Frith 2009; Corlett et al. 2009). While low-
level predictions have been described as noisy and unstable, leading to an increased 
influence of bottom-up signals, higher-level predictions appear overly stable and 
inflexible, resulting in an abnormally strong influence of beliefs over perceptions.  
 
1. Imprecise low-level prior beliefs and aberrant 
salience 
 
 1.1 External input 
There is a growing body of evidence in schizophrenia research linking impairments in 
low-level prediction system to dysregulation of the dopamine system and its role in 
salience attribution (Kapur 2003; Howes & Kapur 2009; Winton-Brown et al. 2014). 
Studies using amphetamine challenge - a procedure that results in a dopamine 
transmission (Calipari & Ferris 2013; Fleckenstein et al. 2007) - revealed schizophrenia 
patients, and to a lesser extent schizotypal individuals (Abi-Dargham et al. 2004; 
Woodward et al. 2011), were characterised by an abnormally elevated dopamine 
transmission (Breier et al. 1997; Laruelle et al. 1996). In line with the idea of an 
excessive dopamine signalling in schizophrenia, several studies then proposed that 
instead of being stimulus-driven, dopamine transmission is erratically triggered in 
psychotic patients (Van Der Gaag 2006; Kapur 2003; Howes & Kapur 2009; Roiser et al. 
2009). It was proposed that context-irrelevant stimuli that should be ignored are 
wrongly assigned salience (referred to as aberrant salience or hypersalience in case of 
excessive salience attribution) (Kapur 2003; Winton-Brown et al. 2014). Signals that 
should have been disregarded early on, reach the prefrontal cortex, leading to conscious 
processing of the information, making it appear as an important event (Braver et al. 
1999). In phenomenological terms, this phenomenon is referred to as hyper-reflexivity 
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(Sass & Parnas 2003; Sass et al. 2013; Pérez-Álvarez et al. 2016), “a type of intensified 
self-consciousness, in which aspects of oneself that are normally or functionally 
unnoticed, pre-reflective, tacit or implicit, are objectivised and experienced as objects 
of consciousness”(Pérez-Álvarez et al. 2016).  
 
In Bayesian terms, this translates into having elements of background noise acquire 
aberrantly high precision (Adams et al. 2013; Sterzer et al. 2016; Kapur 2003).  For 
instance, patients might report paying more attention to things they used to ignore; “My 
senses were sharpened. I became fascinated by the little insignificant things around me” 
(Bowers & Freedman 1966). “My senses seemed alive, colours were very bright, they 
hit me harder. Things appeared clear-cut, I noticed things I had never noticed before” 
(Bowers 1968). Such a chaotic and random salience attribution also renders learning 
difficult, as those aberrant sensory signals keep overriding each other (Adams et al. 
2013), and get incorporated in newly updated cognitive models of the world. If this 
repeats frequently, those internal models get modified continuously, eventually 
preventing patients from building reliable and stable sets of cognitive representations 
of the world (Fletcher & Frith 2009), at least in lower hierarchical levels. The oddball 
paradigm is a good example of this phenomenon. In this paradigm, subjects are 
presented with a sequence of frequent distracting, identical stimuli interspersed with 
rare (different) target stimuli. A change in brain activity referred to as mismatch 
negativity (MMN - usually measured in the form of brain event-related potentials - ERP) 
is elicited by any discriminable change when the target stimuli are compared with the 
repeated stimuli (Winkler et al. 1996). This change in activity is assumed to represent 
transient memory traces (Ritter et al. 1995) that supposedly reside in lower hierarchal 
levels. An appropriate transient memory trace allows to predict the occurrence of the 
frequent stimuli and to decrease the salience of these stimuli in a top-down regulatory 
fashion (by analogy with the efference copy system). Previous studies have reported a 
significantly decreased ERP change in schizophrenia (Javitt et al. 1998; Javitt et al. 
1993), suggesting impairment in the formation of those short-term memory traces. 
Schizophrenia patients’ failure to build reliable memory trace prevents them from 
accurately differentiating repeated stimuli from deviant ones, hence the observed 
decreased MMN. Put differently; patients experience both deviant and recurring stimuli 
as novel and unpredicted. In addition, the memory trace may be associated to 
expectations or priors in lower hierarchical levels. Interestingly, such impairments are 
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also reported in prodromal and at-risk individuals (Brockhaus-Dumke et al. 2005; 
Atkinson et al. 2012), as well as patients’ first-degree relatives (Jessen et al. 2001). Also, 
recent studies have suggested that MMN could be used in order to predict who will 
develop a clinical psychotic syndrome in at-risk populations (Näätänen et al. 2016). 
 
A failure in constructing low-level priors in a bottom-up fashion is also apparent in 
sensory and sensorimotor processes in schizophrenia. Based on the same concept of 
brain habituation to repeated stimuli in order to optimise the brain processing capacity, 
it has been shown that the presentation of a first, weak stimulus (prepulse) attenuates 
the response to a second, stronger stimulus (pulse), provided the time interval between 
the two is between 30 and 500 milliseconds (Braff et al. 1992; Swerdlow et al. 2006; 
Javitt & Freedman 2015). This reduced response, also referred to as 
sensory/sensorimotor gating, can be quantified in two ways. First, this can be achieved 
by measuring the acoustic startle reflex (i.e. blinking) using electromyography (Braff et 
al. 1992). The reduced startle response to the second stimulus, when preceded by a 
weaker prepulse is referred to as prepulse inhibition (PPIn) (Braff et al. 1992; 
Swerdlow et al. 2006; Javitt & Freedman 2015). Deficits in PPIn have been repeatedly 
reported in schizophrenia patients and represent one of the most consistent 
behavioural markers of the disorder (Swerdlow et al. 2006; Javitt & Freedman 2015; 
Braff et al. 1992). Another approach is based on auditory evoked potentials. The first 
largest response to an auditory stimulus is a positive wave appearing 50 milliseconds 
after the stimulus onset and is called the P50 potential (Siegel et al. 1984; Javitt & 
Freedman 2015). In healthy participants, due to the habituation phenomenon the P50 
response to the second stimulus (pulse) is smaller than P50 response to the first signal 
(Siegel et al. 1984). Deficits in P50 attenuation have also been observed in 
schizophrenia (Siegel et al. 1984; Javitt & Freedman 2015). Interestingly, similar 
deficits in both PPIn and P50 attenuation have been reported in people with schizotypal 
personality and schizophrenia patients’ relatives (Giakoumaki 2012; Clementz et al. 
1998; Javitt & Freedman 2015; Siegel et al. 1984), suggesting these impairments are 
part of a trait and not state-dependent. The deficits in MMN, PPIn and P50 brings 
support to the idea psychosis and psychosis-proneness are associated with deficits in 
the bottom-up generation of low-level priors. 
 
Aversive conditioning (Balog et al. 2013; Holt et al. 2009; Jensen et al. 2008; Romaniuk   
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et al. 2010; Holt et al. 2012), reward learning (Murray et al. 2008; Roiser et al. 2009; 
Schlagenhauf et al. 2014) and associative learning (Corlett & Fletcher 2012; Corlett et 
al. 2007) represent more complex forms of learning relying on bottom-up sensory 
processes, which have also been reported as abnormal and weakened in schizophrenia. 
It is argued that such learning deficits are also related to failure to form reliable low-
level priors based on incoming sensory signals (Hofer et al. 2001). 
 
This deficit in generating reliable priors also implies that in certain situations 
schizophrenia patients and psychosis-prone individuals tend to experience the world 
in a more accurate way as their perceptions are less constrained by priors. A study 
investigating perceptual biases in paranormal believers (that can be compared to 
delusion-prone individuals) versus sceptics found that in a situation of high perceptual 
ambiguity and in presence of two equally probable high-level priors (thus comparable 
to a context with no reliable high-level priors), sceptics were more biased towards one 
of the two priors while paranormal believers remained at chance level (Van Elk 2015). 
This is in line with the observation that, when facing perceptual ambiguity in the 
absence of reliable pre-existing priors to bias their perceptions, delusion-prone 
individuals rely more extensively on incoming signals. This can also be put in parallel 
to the hollow-mask illusion, an illusion building on the use of prior perceptual 
knowledge regarding three-dimensional shape of faces, as well as general rules of 
perception, such as Gestalt laws of organisation and perspective (Dima et al. 2009). In 
this illusion, the convex and concave (hollow) sides of a rotating mask are shown 
alternatively. However, the bias of seeing faces as convex is so strong it actually 
overwrites contradicting sensory evidence signalling that the mask is hollow, and 
people experience the hollow side as convex (R L Gregory 1997; Richard L. Gregory 
1997). Interestingly, patients with schizophrenia tend to be more accurate than 
controls, by perceiving more frequently the hollow side as concave, suggesting a larger 
influence of bottom-up input and greater difficulties in using top-down signals 
(knowledge about face perception) in schizophrenia patients (Keane et al. 2016; Dima 
et al. 2009). 
 
 1.2 Internal input  
Importantly, the consequences of impaired low-level priors are not limited to external 
input; they also apply to internally generated signals. In line with this idea, 
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dysfunctional low-level predictive processes have been proposed as underlying 
hallucinations and self-recognition deficits observed in psychotic patients (Fletcher & 
Frith 2009; Notredame et al. 2014; Horga et al. 2014). As mentioned previously, self-
recognition relies on the ability to experience a border between the self and the external 
world, or put in predictive coding terms; between “the expected” self-generated input 
(associated with intentions and efference copy) and “the unexpected” externally 
generated input. It has been shown that psychosis patients experiencing auditory 
hallucinations and passivity cannot cancel self-induced sensory experience such as 
tickling (Blakemore, Smith, et al. 2000) as observed in healthy subjects (Blakemore et 
al. 1998). Moreover, failure to attenuate sensory consequences of self-generated 
actions in schizophrenia was elegantly shown by Shergill and colleagues, in a study 
using the force-matching task in schizophrenia patients (Shergill et al. 2005). The force-
matching task was previously developed by the same group to show that the sensory 
perception is attenuated during self-generated actions (Shergill 2003). One 
particularity of this paradigm is that, a fully functional prediction system actually may 
hinder accurate performance. In this task, a mechanical force is applied to the finger of 
a participant, who is then asked to reproduce the same force intensity by applying it on 
her/his finger either by doing it directly with her/his other hand, or by using a joystick 
(Figure 5). Shergill et al reported that while control participants were accurate in 
reproducing the force when using the joystick, they underestimated the force they 
applied when using their index finger, leading them to apply a greater force than the 
actual one, in line with the sensory attenuation associated with self-generated actions 
described above. Apart from replicating the results from the initial experiment (Shergill 
2003) they observed that although both groups were performing equally well in the 
“joystick condition”, schizophrenia patients were much more accurate than controls 
when using their own finger to reproduce the force. This increased accuracy in force 
matching reflects a decreased sensory attenuation in schizophrenia patients, related to 
dysfunctional sensory (low-level) predictive processes. These results were replicated a 
couple of years later in a delusion-prone population (Teufel et al. 2010), confirming the 
association between impairments in low-level prediction systems and the psychosis 
spectrum.  
 
Impaired self-recognition is one of the consequences of faulty low-level predictive 
processes we decided to investigate in our research work. From a behavioural or 
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clinical perspective, such 
perturbations in the low-
level systems (in that 
case, the efference copy 
system and internal body 
maps) result in 
impairments in the 
experience of body 
awareness, which 
manifest as more 
malleable body 
representations, blurrier  
experience of body 
borders, or aberrant 
feeling of agency. 
Schizophrenia patients 
describe such 
experiences in various 
terms, as reported in 
phenomenological 
studies. For instance, a 
patient declared she felt 
as if she “walked stiffly and did not know how to hold [her] hands”(Ferri et al. 2012), 
while another expressed his current feeling as: “I am no longer myself […] I feel strange, 
I am no longer in my body, it is someone else; I sense my body but it is far away, some 
other place. Here are my legs, my hands, I can also feel my head, but cannot find it again. 
I hear my voice when I speak, but the voice seems to originate from some other place. 
[…] Am I here or there? Am I here or behind?” (Parnas & Handest 2003). Such disturbed 
bodily experiences could be reproduced in experimental settings using paradigms 
building on bodily perceptions. The most commonly used one is the Rubber Hand 
Illusion (RHI). In this paradigm, a participant is tricked to feel ownership over a rubber 
model hand, by placing the fake hand in front of a participant whilst her/his own hand 
is hidden from view. Using two small brushes, the experimenter strokes both hands 
simultaneously. This elicits a feeling of ownership over the fake hand and a shift toward 
Figure 5. Matching Force Generated by 19 Patients With 
Schizophrenia and 19 Healthy Volunteers Using the Right 
Index Finger or Joystick as a Function of the Externally 
Generated Target Forcea 
aDotted line represents perfect performance. On each trial the 
torque motor generated a force between 0.5 and 2.75 Newtons 
on the left index finger for 3 seconds (80 trials in a pseudo-
randomized order). Subjects were then required to reproduce 
the force either by pushing with their right index finger or by 
using a joystick that controlled the torque motor. Each subject 
participated in both conditions in a counterbalanced order. 
The applied forces were measured by using a force transducer 
mounted in the lever of the torque motor. From Sukhwinder et 
al, 2005. Reprinted with permission from The American Journal 
of Psychiatry, Copyright©2005. American Psychiatric 
Association. All Rights Reserved. 
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the rubber hand in the perception of the participant’s hand location (Botvinick & Cohen 
1998). While such bodily illusions are reported in healthy individuals (Botvinick & 
Cohen 1998), they are reported as stronger in both schizophrenia patients (Thakkar et 
al. 2011; Klaver & Dijkerman 2016; Peled et al. 2003) and psychosis-prone individuals 
(Germine et al. 2013; Louzolo et al. 2015). 
 
Other positive symptoms are also thought to relate to impairments involved in self-
recognition processes. Delusions of control, the feeling that one’s own movements are 
being controlled by an external force (Frith et al. 2000), are viewed as stemming from 
a deficit in the integration of the predicted sensory consequences of an action (Frith et 
al. 2000). If this part of the motor action process was lost, a self-generated movement 
would feel alien, and externally-generated. Individuals experiencing those phenomena 
may then try to explain them by assuming other people or external forces are 
controlling them (Frith et al. 2000). Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH), the 
experience of hearing speech in the absence of any external stimulation (Jones & 
Fernyhough 2007), and delusion of thought insertion (a particularly striking form of 
self-disturbance, frequently reported in schizophrenia) (Sterzer et al. 2016) are also 
viewed as a failure in self-monitoring of inner speech (Vercammen et al. 2010; Waters 
et al. 2012; Gould 1949; Bick & Kinsbourne 1987; Horga et al. 2014; Jardri et al. 2016; 
Allen et al. 2007; McGuire et al. 1995). A mechanism similar to the one described in 
delusion of control is thought to underlie these phenomena, but instead of a failure to 
predict sensory consequences of a motor action, the deficit relates to inner speech and 
though processes (Jones & Fernyhough 2007; Sterzer et al. 2016). These studies stress 
the importance of understanding the mechanisms that lead to a dysfunctional efference 
copy system. 
 
2. Inflexible high-level prior beliefs 
 
As mentioned previously, delusions are  inflexible erroneous idiosyncratic beliefs (high-
level priors) (Fletcher & Frith 2009; Coltheart et al. 2011; Eisenacher & Zink 2016; 
Woodward et al. 2008). This suggests that, in terms of predictive coding, psychosis is 
associated with high precision high-level priors. This high precision renders the priors 
difficult to change and may lead to a larger top-down influence of these beliefs on 
perceptions (Adams et al. 2013). The inflexible nature of delusions has been 
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reproduced experimentally by studies investigating schizophrenia patients’ ability to 
assess the likelihood of statements or short scenarios with increasing degrees of 
implausibility, and to update their judgements accordingly. This body of research 
revealed schizophrenia patients’ tendency to stick longer to initial beliefs, even in the 
face of contradicting evidence; the so-called bias against disconfirmatory evidence 
(BADE – i.e. the tendency to disregard evidence that goes against the current 
assumption) (Woodward et al. 2008; Moritz & Woodward 2006; Veckenstedt et al. 
2011; Woodward et al. 2006; McLean et al. 2016). This bias was also observed in non-
clinical delusion-prone populations (Buchy et al. 2007; Woodward et al. 2007; Orenes 
et al. 2012). Recent studies have complemented these observations by showing that 
psychosis-related states were associated with an increased effect of high-level priors 
on perceptions (Schmack et al. 2013; Teufel et al. 2015). More specifically, in 
comparison with control individuals, it has been suggested that when schizophrenia 
patients (Teufel et al. 2015) and delusion-prone individuals (Schmack et al. 2013; 
Teufel et al. 2015) are confronted to ambiguous perceptual stimuli, their perceptions 
are strongly biased towards beliefs they have acquired beforehand from specific visual 
or verbal instructions.  
 
It might seem paradoxical that both an unstable (imprecise) prediction system and an 
overly stable (precise) prediction system may coexist in the same individuals. A 
common tentative explanation is to view them as causally related; one triggering the 
other (Kapur 2003; Corlett et al. 2010). As mentioned above, psychosis patients appear 
to have a noisy low-level system, preventing them from building reliable priors. The 
constant change in those predictions, the repeated appearance of background noise 
elements into conscious processing and the associated disturbances in self-recognition, 
all lead to an unsettling experience for the individual, rendering the world very 
unpredictable (Kapur 2003; Adams et al. 2013). Delusions may be conceptualised as a 
cognitive effort by patients to make sense out of those strange experiences and create 
a somewhat coherent model of the world (both external and internal) in order to reduce 
cognitive dissonance (Kapur 2003; Corlett et al. 2010). Corlett and colleagues furthered 
Kapur’s idea of delusions as a top-down cognitive explanation used to make sense of 
aberrant salience (Kapur 2003), by suggesting delusions correspond to false inferences 
about the world, stemming from a failure in encoding uncertainty about sensory 
information (Corlett et al. 2010). While both Kapur and Corlett et al present delusions 
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as a secondary effect of aberrant salience (Kapur 2003; Corlett et al. 2010), we are 
slightly challenging this view in the present thesis (Study IV), by suggesting that 
delusions are not simply a passive adaptive consequence of a deficient low-level 
prediction system (Kapur 2003), but also represent a proactive strategy to over-
integrate explicit information at a high-level, and use it to interpret a noisy  
environment. However, the exact mechanisms underlying belief inflexibility observed 
in psychosis-related states still remain unclear. 
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II – Aim and hypotheses 
a. Study I 
 
Building on the well-documented self-awareness disturbances in psychosis-related 
states, Study I aimed to test to what extent delusion-proneness was associated with 
impairment in terms of self-recognition (both body ownership and agency) and to 
investigate whether these impairments were related to the hypersalience hypothesis 
and/or an impaired low-level prediction system. 
 
We used the active Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) paradigm (Kalckert & Ehrsson 2012) as 
it relies on perceptual and cognitive mechanisms related to bodily-awareness, thus 
making it an ecologically relevant paradigm in the context of self-awareness 
disturbances. While impairments in some processes related to self-recognition (i.e. 
efference copy) had been previously reported in delusion-prone individuals (Teufel et 
al. 2010), the relation between these disrupted processes and sense of 
agency/ownership had not been investigated in psychosis-proneness.  
 
Previous studies using an active condition in the RHI paradigm reported a strong 
increase in the experience of agency in the active condition compared to the passive 
one (Kalckert & Ehrsson 2012; Dummer et al. 2009). The difference between passive 
and active conditions lies in the fact the latter is the only condition involving motor 
predictions (intentional signals and efference copy). We argue that motor predictions 
are thought to pertain to the lower end of the processing hierarchy. If delusion-prone 
individuals are indeed characterised by a faulty low-level prediction system, their 
experience of the active and the passive conditions (in terms of sense of ownership and 
agency) should not differ much. We thus hypothesised that delusion-proneness would 
be associated with a smaller increase in agency for active versus passive movements. 
We also expected a similar, though more limited, effect in terms of ownership. 
 
b. Study II 
 
Overlaps between psychosis and ADHD/ASD tendencies have been reported previously 
(Pallanti & Salerno 2015; Dalsgaard et al. 2014; Stahlberg et al. 2004; Cederlöf et al. 
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2016; Chisholm et al. 2015; de Lacy & King 2013; Stone & Iguchi 2011; Sullivan et al. 
2012). This can have important implications when studying psychosis-proneness, 
because some results observed in delusion-prone individuals might actually be 
associated with ADHD or ASD tendencies rather than psychosis-related mechanisms. It 
is thus crucial to take those traits into account when studying delusion-proneness, 
specifically.  
 
Study II used a large healthy male population (n=925) to explore the relation between 
delusion-proneness, ADHD- and ASD-traits. We first investigated the extent to which 
ADHD and ASD traits correlated with delusion-proneness in a healthy male population. 
In a second step, we aimed to identify which prototypical dimensions in the ADHD and 
ASD traits were related to delusion-proneness. We hypothesised that delusion-
proneness scores would correlate positively with ASRS and AQ scores, and that these 
relations would remain when limiting the analyses to prototypical items. 
 
c. Study III 
 
Study III builds on the similarities between delusion-like behaviours and the 
phenomenon of confabulation observed in schizophrenia (Fotopoulou et al. 2007). 
Here, we aimed to study whether delusion-prone individuals showed an increased 
tendency to accept false feedback - a behaviour that has been shown to be linked to 
confabulation - when facing perceptual ambiguity.  
 
Unlike confabulations in memory-related disorders like Alzheimer or Korsakoff 
syndrome, that correspond to an attempt from the brain to fill in blanks and make sense 
of scattered memories (Talland 1961), confabulations associated with psychosis are 
considered to be related to formal thought disorder. These confabulations rather 
originate from a reconstruction/reorganisation of thoughts. Earlier work showed that, 
such confabulations include some elements that were present in the original story that 
was provided to the patients (Shakeel & Docherty 2015; Nathaniel-James & Frith 1996). 
As mentioned previously delusions are unshakable and erroneous idiosyncratic beliefs 
usually used to explain away some strange experiences (Kapur 2003). Despite their 
unsubstantiated nature and content bizarreness, delusional beliefs do incorporate 
some elements that are present in patients’ life or society, or that patients got to know 
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or read about. Delusions and psychosis-related confabulations thus seem to share some 
similarities (Shakeel & Docherty 2015). They both involve the production of unfounded 
claims, devoid of the intent to deceive others. In addition these claims are inadequately 
evaluated, leading to a failure to reject them even in face of contradictory evidence  
(Turner & Coltheart 2010). Instead, they are actually associated with the production of 
secondary supporting claims (Turner & Coltheart 2010). 
 
In order to study whether delusion-prone individuals displayed an increased tendency 
to accept false feedback (also referred to as liberal acceptance bias) (Moritz & 
Woodward 2004; McLean et al. 2016; Moritz et al. 2009), we used a modified version of 
the choice blindness(Johansson et al. 2005), a paradigm that challenges the reliability 
of low/intermediate-level priors and leads to the induction of confabulation. Choice 
blindness has been shown to be closely related to confabulations (Johansson et al., 
2005) and therefore served as a proxy for confabulations. 
 
d. Study IV 
 
As discussed previously, a paradox in psychosis research lies in the fact patients with 
psychosis seem to have both imprecise low-level priors and overly precise high -level 
priors. The different levels of the processing hierarchy interact closely, so in order to 
try to get a better understanding of the low- versus high-level paradox, it is preferable 
to study both ends of the hierarchy together, rather than in isolation. This was the 
specific aim in Study IV. As opposed to Study I and Study III that initially focused on the 
lower end of the processing hierarchy, Study IV allowed us to tap separately on both 
low- and high-levels, in the context of complex cognitive processing (i.e. social 
judgement related to fear learning). To our knowledge, this was the first time such a 
paradigm was used with a delusion-prone population.  
 
Using a combination of classical fear conditioning (bottom-up low-level processes) and 
instructed fear learning (top-down high-level beliefs) (Olsson & Phelps 2004; Olsson & 
Phelps 2007), we first aimed to show a double dissociation in delusion-prone 
participants. Namely, we hypothesised that delusion-prone individuals would be 
impaired in the condition relying on low-level priors (i.e. classical fear conditioning – 
non-instructed conditioning), while they would show a larger influence of high-level 
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priors (i.e. instructed conditioning) than controls. In terms of behaviour this would 
translate into delusion-prone individuals showing reduced evaluative conditioning and 
autonomic responses to non-instructed conditioned stimuli (classical fear 
conditioning), as shown in previous studies on psychosis-related states (Balog et al. 
2013; Holt et al. 2012; Holt et al. 2009; Jensen et al. 2008; Romaniuk et al. 2010), while 
a normal conditioned response pattern would be restored, or even more strongly 
expressed, when verbal instructions regarding the conditioned stimuli would be 
provided prior to the conditioning phase.  
 
Since we were also interested in the mechanisms underlying the influence of high-level 
beliefs on lower-level processes related to fear learning (Olsson & Phelps 2004; Olsson 
& Phelps 2007), we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in order to 
investigate whether differences were also observed in terms of brain activity in regions 
related to high-level expectations. We expected the prefrontal cortex, and more 
specifically the lateral orbito-frontal cortex (lOfc), to be involved, as these regions have 
been reported in cognitive reappraisal (Wager et al. 2008) as well as expectation-
related processes, like placebo effect (Petrovic et al. 2010; Petrovic et al. 2002; Petrovic 
et al. 2005). Building on Schmack’s study on the influence of high-level expectations on 
sensory processing, where an association between sensory processing and lOfc was 
reported in delusion-prone individuals (Schmack et al. 2013), we hypothesised group 
differences in terms of activity in this region (lOfc), and in terms of interaction between 
lOfc and the main areas involved in fear and pain processing.  
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III - Methods  
a. Questionnaires 
1. Peters’ Delusion Inventory 
 
As discussed previously, in order to try to have a better and more thorough 
understanding of the mechanisms underlying psychosis it is important not to limit 
research to clinical populations but to also investigate populations that are at-risk or 
prone to psychosis. Therefore, we adopted this approach in the present work. In order 
to identify individuals showing delusion-proneness, we used Peters’ Delusion 
Inventory (PDI) (Peters et al. 2004). PDI is a questionnaire designed to assess 
delusional ideation in the normal population (Peters, Joseph, et al. 1999). In its original 
form, the questionnaire contained 40 items. A shorter version containing 21 items of 
the original questionnaire was later developed (Peters et al. 2004). This is the version 
we used in our studies. Items are in the form of questions investigating the presence of 
different psychosis-related experiences (e.g. paranoia, paranormal belief, thought 
disturbances, and so forth - see appendix). In addition to evaluating delusional ideation, 
the questionnaire also takes into account the level of conviction, preoccupation, and 
distress associated with the belief. These dimensions respectively turn into conviction, 
preoccupation and distress scores. For each endorsed item, people have to rate on a 5-
point Likert-scale (1 to 5) how convinced, preoccupied and distressed they are by the 
given experience. These sub-scores are interesting as they give a more detailed picture 
of the delusion-proneness of an individual. We argue that the distress dimension is 
particularly interesting as it has been reported main factor differentiating clinical 
population from at-risk populations (Peters, Day, et al. 1999; Lim et al. 2011).  
 
In Study I, a dimensional approach to delusion-proneness was implemented, as we 
were interested in studying delusion-proneness as a whole. Therefore, the participants 
were not pooled into groups. The main analyses consisted of correlations between 
ownership/agency ratings and PDI Yes/No scores. Similarly, in Study II we used this 
dimensional approach, as we were interested in relations between delusion-proneness 
and ADHD/ASD traits. 
 
In Study III and Study IV on the other hand, we included two groups, i.e. a control group 
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and a delusion-prone group, in 
the analyses in order to ensure 
to include highly delusion-
prone individuals (in Study III 
we started with a dimensional 
approach but changed it to a 
group approach given the 
limited number of delusion-
prone subjects in the sample). 
Participants were selected 
based on their Yes/No score. 
Due to the skewed distribution 
of PDI, we needed to screen a 
large number of individuals in 
order to find enough people 
with a PDI-score above 10 for 
Study III. In total we gathered 
data on 925 male healthy 
participants aged 18 to 35 (mean=24.98 years, SD=0.161). The distribution of the 
Yes/No score (Figure 6) was quite similar to the one reported in Peters’ original study 
on the 21-item version of the questionnaire (Peters et al. 2004). In Study II we used the 
data we gathered on these 925 participants, in order to study the relation between 
delusion-proneness and ADHD-/ASD-traits. 
 
2. Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale  
 
In order to estimate ADHD tendencies we used the Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale 
(ASRS), a self-report screening scale developed by the World Health Organization, in 
order to measure ADHD tendencies and to be used as a part of a clinical ADHD-
assessments in adult individuals (Kessler et al. 2005). The questionnaire contains 18 
questions. Using a 5-point Likert scale, participants have to report how frequently a 
particular symptom of ADHD has occurred to them over the past 6 months. The 
responses range from never (0), rarely (1), sometimes (2), often (3), to very often (4), 
to a total score range from 0 to 72. The questionnaire can be divided into two parts 
Figure 6. Distribution of PDI Yes/No scores in our 
sample of 925 healthy male participants. 
Participants were recruited via social media and filled 
in the questionnaire online – Study II and IV 
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(part A/part B) out of which part A is used as a screening tool. In the present study, we 
used the full questionnaire (18 questions) and we ran our analyses on the summed 
frequency scores (referred to as the total ASRS score). We used the screening part (part 
A) in a sub-analysis, in order to exclude individuals that possibly show relevant 
symptoms. 
3. Autism Quotient 
 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) tendencies were estimated with the Autism Quotient 
(AQ); a self-administered questionnaire developed in order to assess the degree to 
which an adult individual is displaying autistic traits (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001). The 50 
items of the questionnaire can be grouped into five subscales (10 questions each) that 
target social skills, attention switching, attention to detail, communication and 
imagination, and for a maximum score of 50 points. The higher the score, the stronger 
autistic-like behaviour tendencies. A score of 32 is considered as a cut-off distinguishing 
individuals with a clinically significant levels of autistic traits (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001). 
 
4. Factor analysis on self-report questionnaires 
 
In order to identify which dimensions of ADHD and ASD traits were correlating most 
strongly with delusion-proneness we conducted a factor analysis (exploratory 
structural equation modelling (Marsh et al. 2014)) on all the items of the three 
questionnaires put together. This method consists in applying an exploratory search for 
a restricted number of factors and then testing the fit of the model with a confirmatory 
approach. We started the analysis with a 3-factor model and ran it until an acceptable 
model fit was reached (RMSEA under 0.06 and a CFI over 0.95 (Brown 2015)). We then 
studied correlations between all the factors of the best fitting model.   
 
b. Active Rubber Hand Illusion 
 
The active RHI is a modified version of the classical RHI (Botvinick & Cohen 1998) in 
which the participants control the movements of the index finger of a model hand, in 
full view, by moving their own finger (hidden from their view) (Kalckert & Ehrsson 
2012). In the original paradigm (classical RHI), a fake rubber hand is placed in front of 
a participant, in full view, whilst the participant’s own hand is hidden from her/his 
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view. The experimenter uses two brushes in order to simultaneously stroke 
participant’s hand and the rubber one. After a few minutes, most of the participants 
start to experience the touch as originating from the viewed brush (shift in perceived 
hand location), as if the rubber hand was their own hand (feeling of ownership). 
Asynchronous stimulation and implausible spatial location of the model hand reduce 
significantly the illusion (Botvinick & Cohen 1998). This suggests this illusion builds on 
visuo-tactile integration as well as temporal and spatial congruency of the stimulation. 
Interestingly, schizophrenia patients tend to experience the RHI faster and stronger 
than controls, in line with the idea of a more flexible body representation and weakened 
sense of the self (Peled et al. 2000; Thakkar et al. 2011). Similar results were also 
reported in psychosis-prone individuals (Germine et al. 2013). 
 
As mentioned previously, self-recognition and bodily awareness rely on a combination 
between the sense of ownership and the feeling of agency. Considering the classical RHI 
only tackles the sense of body ownership, the ecological validity of this paradigm is 
limited. Moreover, since classical RHI does not tap on agency it cannot study the 
phenomenon of over-inclusive agency experience observed in schizophrenia when 
viewing a moving hand (Franck et al. 2001; Daprati et al. 1997). The active RHI 
paradigm, on the other hand, offers the possibility to generate active movements, thus 
adding the sense of agency to body ownership (Kalckert & Ehrsson 2012; Kalckert & 
Ehrsson 2014). We ran this paradigm on 71 participants (mean age=24.3 years, range 
18–42; 30 males) who were also asked to complete the PDI-21 questionnaire in order 
to assess their delusion-proneness (mean=6.568, SD=3.42). 
 
In this paradigm, the setup is somewhat similar to the classical RHI; a life-size wooden 
hand is placed in full view on a box in front of the participant whose own hand is hidden 
from view, in the box below the model hand (Figure 7). Both hands are wearing a white 
latex glove, and an opaque cloth is covering the participant’s arm as well as part of the 
fake hand. From the participant’s perspective, it looks like she/he is looking at her/his 
own hand. The active RHI does not involve paintbrush striking, but finger movements. 
A mechanical coupling device placed between the model hand’s index finger and the 
participant’s own index finger, allows the participant to actively move the wooden 
finger (active condition). It also makes it possible for the experimenter to move both 
the model hand’s and the participant’s finger, while the participant is instructed to 
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remain still (passive condition) – thereby excluding (or minimizing) the involvement of 
motor intention and efference copy. The connecting stick apparatus also allows creating 
a time delay between the participant’s movements and the wooden finger, allowing 
synchronous or asynchronous movements, leading to four different conditions: active 
synchronous, active asynchronous, passive synchronous, passive asynchronous. 
 
Each trial consisted of a 2-minute session during which participants were either 
performing tapping movements with their index finger (active synchronous or active 
asynchronous) or were passively experiencing movements generated by the 
experimenter (passive synchronous or passive asynchronous). The four conditions 
were randomised and counterbalanced across participants. After each trial participants 
rated their feeling of ownership over the model hand and agency on the finger 
movements (four ratings each), using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “-3” (totally 
disagree) to “+3” (totally agree) and with 0 signalling uncertainty.  
 
 
Figure 7. Setup of the moving rubber hand paradigm – a life-size model wooden model 
hand was placed on a small table/box while the participant’s hand lied underneath, hidden 
from the participant’s view. Both hands were wearing the same white latex glove, and an 
opaque cloth was covering the participant’s arm as well as part of the fake hand. This created 
the impression that the wooden hand the participant was seeing was his/her own. A 
connecting stick placed between the model hand’s index finger and the participant’s own index 
finger, allowed the participant to move actively the wooden finger (active condition). It also 
allowed the experimenter to move both the model hand and the participant’s finger, while the 
participant was instructed to remain still (passive condition). Reprinted from When Passive 
Feels Active - Delusion-Proneness Alters Self-Recognition in the Moving Rubber Hand Illusion. 
Louzolo et al. PLOS ONE. 2015. 10(6).   
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c. Choice Blindness 
 
Choice blindness relies on the manipulation of choices a participant was asked to make. 
We suggest that this paradigm is predominantly associated with low/intermediate-end 
of the processing hierarchy, as the priors are generated under a short time during the 
choice phase (with a duration of a few seconds), preventing them from being processed 
at a high-level. In the original paradigm, the experimenter is sitting in front of the 
participants, while holding two pictures in her/his hands. The participant is asked to 
point at the picture she/he prefers. Then the experimenter puts back both picture cards, 
moves them toward the participant and turns up the selected card while the other one 
remains turned down. The participant is required to explain orally why she/he chose 
that specific picture. Due to a visual trick, the picture that reappears is the one that was 
not selected in some trials. Participants are not informed about the possibility of 
manipulations. Choice blindness refers to the instances when the participant does not 
notice a picture manipulation and confabulates on the reasons behind her/his 
preference. 
 
 In Study III, we used a computerised version of the paradigm. In the original paradigm 
participants interact with the experimenter and can directly report to him/her when a 
picture is not the right one. This was not the possible in our study. Instead, we had to 
measure the detection rate at the time of each trial, without verbal report. In order to 
do so, we constructed a preference scale that was split into two halves: a negative and 
a positive part. This allowed participants to rate how much more they liked the picture 
that reappeared. The left anchor stated “a lot less”, the middle one “neutral” and the 
right anch  or “a lot more”. A negative rating was counted as a detected trial. To make 
sure participants understood they had to use the left scale in case of a manipulation, 
they were instructed that if, they clicked too quickly or simply changed their mind, and 
thus the picture they saw was no longer the one they preferred, they had to indicate this 
by using the left scale (i.e. between “a lot less” and “neutral” anchors). In addition, they 
were instructed that, although they had to do their best to use the whole positive scale, 
if they were not really sure how much more they preferred the picture they selected, 
they should click somewhere close to the “neutral” anchor on the right half of the rating 
scale. 
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d. Instructed fear learning 
1. Paradigm and apparatus 
 
The instructed fear learning paradigm was designed in order to study the influence of 
consciously perceived written instructions (high-order input) on bottom-up low-level 
learning.  The design can be summarised as a classical delay fear conditioning paradigm 
preceded by an instruction phase. 
 
The principle of classical delay fear condition lies in the repeated pairing of a 
conditioned stimulus (CS; a stimulus that does not trigger any response initially, e.g. a 
neutral picture) and an unconditioned stimulus (UCS; a stimulus that in itself triggers a 
fear response, e.g. a mild electrical stimulation). The UCS usually co-terminates the CS 
presentation. After several repetitions of this pairing, the UCS is no longer needed to 
induce the fear response (assessed by ratings or autonomic responses). The subject has 
learned that the CS predicts the UCS, and the presentation of the CS only is enough to 
trigger a fear (Knight 2004).  
Figure 8. Timeline for the instructed fear learning paradigm. The paradigm started with 
an instruction phase, followed by a fear acquisition phase, and ended with an extinction phase. 
In acquisition and extinction phases each CS was displayed 12 times for 5 sec, in a pseudo-
randomised order. The jittered inter-trial interval was 11.5± 2 sec. In acquisition phase both 
instructed and non-instructed CS+ were coupled with UCS (electrical stimulation) with a 50% 
contingency. There was no UCS in the extinction phase. Before and after each of the three 
phases participants had to perform likability ratings referred to as T0 (baseline ratings, i.e. 
before instructions), T1 (after instructions), T2 (after acquisition) and T3 (after extinction). 
Following the last rating (T3) participants were shown the four CS and asked to click on the 
two that gave them shocks. 
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In our study, CS consisted of four Caucasian males with a neutral facial expression: 2 
CS+ and 2 CS-, randomised across participants.  We used mild electric stimulation on 
the left forearm as UCS. The intensity of the stimulation was set by the participant 
during a standard workup procedure. The paradigm comprised an instruction phase, 
followed by a fear acquisition phase, and then an extinction phase (Figure 8).   
 
In the instruction phase two of the faces (instructed CS+ and CS-; iCS+/iCS-) were 
presented together with a fabricated short written description about their personality 
Figure 9. Schema of the 4 CS during the instruction phase. In instruction phase, two of the 
faces (iCS+/iCS-) were presented together with information about their UCS contingencies 
that included a fabricated short description (in Swedish in the experiment) about their 
personality and the risk of being associated with a “shock”. The two other CS faces (non-
instructed CS+/CS-; niCS+/niCS-) contained no information about their contingencies with the 
UCS. Instructions were presented twice (followed by ratings) in order to increase the effect of 
information. After both presentations participants were asked to select which picture would 
give them shocks (iCS+) and which one would never do (iCS-). This was used both to make 
sure they understood and integrated the instructions, and to reinforce their expectations 
regarding the contingencies. 
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and the risk of being associated with a “shock” (Figure 9). The two other CS faces (non-
instructed CS+ and CS-; niCS+/niCS-) were presented without any information about 
their UCS contingencies. In the acquisition phase, each CS was shown 12 times for 5 
seconds, and the jittered inter-trial interval was set to 11.5± 2 seconds. Fifty percent of 
the CS+ presentations were co-terminated with the UCS (50% contingency). The 
presentation order was pseudo-randomised to avoid the presentation of two reinforced 
trials in a row. The extinction phase followed the same procedure, except that no CS+ 
presentation was reinforced. 
 
2. Behavioural response 
 
Explicit response – likability ratings 
Explicit fear learning was assessed with likability ratings, as in evaluative fear 
conditioning (Petrovic et al. 2008). We argue that explicit ratings mirror a semantic 
higher order processing of information and therefore represent higher order priors. 
Before and after each phase of the paradigm, participants were asked to rate with a 
visual analogue scale, how friendly they thought each CS-face appeared (left anchor 
stated “the least sympathetic person you can imagine”, and the right anchor stated “the 
most sympathetic person you can imagine” in Swedish). During the debriefing session 
following the experiment, participants were also asked to rate from 0 to 10 how much 
they felt they had been influenced by the instructions, and by the “shocks”, respectively. 
 
Implicit response – skin conductance response (SCR) 
In addition to the explicit conditioning response, skin conductance was also recorded 
during the acquisition and extinction phases as an implicit online measure of fear 
conditioning. Electrodermal activity recording is used as a measure of emotional states 
since skin resistance varies with the activity of eccrine sweat glands that are associated 
with an emotional stress response (Dawson et al. 2007; Boucsein 2012). Eccrine sweat 
glands are specific sweat glands found on the whole body but with the highest 
concentration in palms and soles. Their primary role is thermoregulation; however, it 
is unclear whether the glands specifically located on palmar or plantar sites are actually 
involved in evaporation cooling. Instead they seem to be rather related to response to 
psychologically relevant stimuli (Dawson et al. 2007; Boucsein 2012). Eccrine sweat 
glands are controlled by the sympathetic nervous system; when the sympathetic 
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nervous system is activated (e.g. when a fearful stimulus is presented) these glands 
release sweat that then rises along the cells’ tubular duct, to be excreted on the skin 
surface. As sweat accumulates in the duct, the water and electrolytes it contains 
increase electrical conductivity. The amplitude of the conductance increase is 
proportional to the sympathetic arousal, and although small, the response can be 
recorded by placing two recording electrodes on the skin (in Study IV electrodes were 
attached to the distal phalange of the first and third fingers of participants’ left hand). 
Thus the amplitude of the conductance change can be used as an indication of emotional 
and sympathetic responses (Lang et al. 1990; Boucsein 2012; Dawson et al. 2007). 
 
Unfortunately, SCR is not always a reliable measure due to diverse reasons, and some 
people fail to display this signal when presented with relevant stimuli. In addition, when 
acquired in an fMRI scanner the data is often noisy. Here we only used SCR data from 
the so-called responders, namely participants who displayed a SCR to at least 20% of 
the presentations of each CS. Nevertheless, many of them were characterised by a low 
reactivity, meaning that they did not respond to much more than this 20%-threshold. 
Thus, the poor quality of our SCR data limited the number of analyses that could be 
performed using this variable. 
 
e. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(fMRI) 
1. Data acquisition 
 
In order to understand the neuronal underpinnings of our behavioural results in Study 
IV we simultaneously measured the brain activity using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI). fMRI is a non-invasive brain imaging technique that allows an indirect 
measurement of brain activity, based on a phenomenon called the blood oxygenation 
level dependent (BOLD) effect (Buxton 2009). 
 
Like any other organ, the brain depends on oxygen to function. While the brain only 
represents 2% of the body weight, its oxygen needs take up to 20% of the total oxygen 
consumption (Raichle & Gusnard 2002). Oxygen is delivered to the different organs via 
blood circulation. More precisely, the red blood cells contain an oxygen-carrying 
molecule called haemoglobin. Haemoglobin consists of four subunits, each of them  
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containing one iron ion in 
its centre (Hardison 
1996). Iron is the 
component that actually 
binds to oxygen. Oxygen-
bound haemoglobin is 
referred to as 
oxyhaemoglobin  (oxyHb). 
When it loses oxygen 
(deoxyhaemoglobin - 
deoxyHb) its magnetic 
properties change; it 
becomes paramagnetic, and thus, decreases MR (magnetic resonance) signal. When a 
brain area is active, glucose metabolism, oxygen metabolism, blood flow and blood 
volume increase locally. However, upon increased activity (increased consumption of 
oxygen by the cells) the 
𝑜𝑥𝑦𝐻𝑏
𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑥𝑦𝐻𝑏
 ratio increases. The reason behind this seemingly 
paradox is the fact that upon neural activity the increase in blood flow is much larger 
than the oxygen metabolic rate (Buxton 2009) (Figure 10). Since OxyHb is less 
paramagnetic than deoxyHb, an increase in the 
𝑜𝑥𝑦𝐻𝑏
𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑥𝑦𝐻𝑏
 ratio leads to a local increase in 
MR signal. The amplitude of this signal change, which is measured by fMRI, is related to 
the magnitude of the blood flow change (Buxton 2009). Thus, this technique does not 
measure brain activity per se. Instead, it captures changes in blood flow and oxygen 
metabolism (i.e. the BOLD signal), and from these, infers brain activity. It should be kept 
in mind that the metabolic change in blood oxygenation detected by fMRI is not 
immediate. It follows the stimulus presentation onset with a delay of about 6 seconds. 
This time lag has to be taken into account when modelling the BOLD signal change in 
relation to stimulus presentations (Buxton 2009; Liao et al. 2002). This means the BOLD 
response will have a width of about 3 sec (for short stimulus presentation) and its peak 
will be at about 5-6 seconds after the stimulus onset. Due to this time delay, the 
temporal resolution achieved by fMRI is quite low (Glover 2011). One of its strengths 
on the other hand, is its good spatial resolution (3-4 mm in most applications) (Glover 
2011). 
 
In our study, participants performed the instructed learning paradigm while lying down 
Figure 10. Change in oxyHb/deoxyHb ratio during 
increased neural activity. Reprinted by permission from 
Macmillan Publishers Ltd: Nature Reviews Drug Discovery, 
Borsook et al, copyright 2006 
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in a 3T MR General Electric scanner, with a 32-channel head coil. A T1-weighted 
structural image was acquired before the paradigm started. Functional scans were 
obtained using a gradient echo sequence T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging scan 
(TR=2.334 sec, TE=30 ms, flip angle=90 degrees, 49 axial slices in ascending order 
(thickness=3 mm) and a field of view (FOV)=22cm, matrix size=72x72x3mm). The first 
four scans were defined as dummy scans and discarded from the analysis. Functional 
image acquisition comprised two sessions of 245 volumes each that corresponded to 
the acquisition phase and the extinction phases in the conditioning paradigm. There 
was a break of approximately 4-5 minutes between the two sessions during which 
participants completed likability ratings (T2).  
 
2. Data analysis 
 
For each participant the data were pre-processed and analysed using the default 
pipeline of SPM8 software package (Statistical parametric mapping, Welcome 
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). For 
more detail, see Methods in Study IV. 
 
For the first-level analyses, a general linear model (GLM) with one regressor per CS type 
(iCS+, iCS−, niCS+ and niCS−) - each onset modelled as a 5-second event - and one 
regressor for the UCS presentation. In addition, the four CS regressors were also 
parametrically modulated with a linearly changing function to capture activity changes 
over time. This resulted in a total of 9 regressors that were convolved with the canonical 
hemodynamic response function and entered into the GLM as implemented in SPM. 
Motion regressors were also included in the model. The acquisition and the extinction 
phases were modelled and analysed separately.  
 
In a second level analysis we studied the main effects of 1) conditioning (CS+ versus   
CS-), 2) instructions (instructed CS versus non-instructed CS), and 3) pain for all 
subjects together. When studying group differences between delusion-prone and 
controls on these activations we used a region of interest (ROI) approach in order to 
increase the sensitivity. For the main effect of instructions, we applied small-volume 
correction (SVC) for multiple comparisons within an anatomical lOfc ROI (defined using 
SPM pick atlas) as our primary hypothesis was targeting the lOfc. The remaining ROIs 
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consisted of spheres (6mm radius) centred on the maximally activated voxels in caudal 
ACC (cACC) and anterior insula for the conditioning effect, and on posterior insula for 
the effect of pain.  All our results were assessed at p<0.05, family-wise error (FWE) 
corrected for multiple comparisons.  
 
In addition to studying activation patterns, we also examined functional connectivity 
using a psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis in SPM. This type of analyses 
allows the identification of context-induced changes in the strength of connectivity 
between brain regions. We assessed connectivity changes between the right lOfc and 
the rest of the brain based on the previously reported involved of right lOfc in placebo 
and emotional reappraisal appraisal (Petrovic et al. 2005; Petrovic et al. 2010; Wager 
et al. 2008). In order to do so we used a sphere with a radius of 6 mm centred on the 
peak activation in the right lOfc region in the instruction contrast (GLM analyses).  Two 
contrasts were used for the PPI analyses as the physiological factor: the general effects 
of instruction (iCS vs niCS) and the instruction effect on conditioning (i(CS+ vs CS-) 
versus ni(CS+ vs CS-).  Our results were again assessed at p<0.05, FWE corrected for 
multiple comparisons.  
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VI – Summary of the results  
a. Study I 
 
In Study I we manipulated the experience of ownership and agency in delusion-prone 
individuals in order to try to understand whether hypersalience, or a faulty low-level 
prediction system (characterised by imprecise priors), could explain self-recognition 
impairments observed in psychosis-related states. Our results point towards the 
involvement of both mechanisms in delusion-proneness. 
 
As mentioned previously, the main difference between active and passive conditions is 
the presence of intentions and motor predictions (including efference copy) in the first 
condition. Thus, if low-level predictions were the only dysfunctional system (in terms 
of imprecise priors), only the active condition would be showing a difference related to 
delusion-proneness. On the other hand, if the hypersalience hypothesis was the source 
of the impairment, then both the active and the passive conditions would show 
increased self-recognition (exacerbation of the illusion, and aberrant over-inclusive 
agency, respectively), due to an increased integration of incoming signals.  
 
Overall, our results revealed that delusion-proneness was associated with aberrant 
self-recognition in line with previous work reporting more flexible body 
representations in psychosis-related states (Thakkar et al. 2011; Peled et al. 2000).  
More specifically, all participants reported similar levels of agency feeling over the 
model hand independent of their degree of delusion-proneness (r=-0.111, p=0.358). 
Interestingly, in the passive condition – a condition under which the feeling of agency 
is normally abolished (Kalckert & Ehrsson 2012) – delusion-prone individuals 
experienced levels of agency related to the rubber hand that were similar to the ones 
they reported during the active condition (Figure 11). The over-inclusive agency 
phenomenon observed in the passive condition suggests that delusion-prone 
individuals tended to experience externally-generated movements as self-produced 
produced, in line with previous work (Daprati et al. 1997; Franck et al. 2001). The result 
implies that in the absence of motor predictions and intentions, delusion-prone 
individuals construct an abnormal feeling of agency based solely on the aberrant 
(hyper) integration of incoming signals integration of incoming signals. This 
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observation together with the general increase of ownership feeling with delusion-
proneness, support the hypersalience hypothesis in psychosis-related states. In the 
active condition, hypersalience of external input would exacerbate the normal feeling 
of agency. However, our data suggests that in case of experience of agency in the active 
condition, the hypersalience bias would actually compensate the lack of reliable motor 
predictions (including imprecise priors). The experience of agency would thus 
seemingly be close to normal but instead of relying on the motor prediction system, it 
would be driven by an increased integration of external input.  
 
In summary Study I brings supporting evidence to the hypothesis of an impaired low-
level prediction system co-existing with a hypersalience bias.  
 
 
 
b. Study II 
  
In Study II we examined the relation between delusion-proneness and ADHD/ASD 
tendencies, and investigated which particular dimensions were the most closely related 
Figure 11. Correlations between PDI score and agency (A), and ownership (B) ratings, in active 
(red) and passive (blue) conditions. A. Active conditions r=-0.111, p=0.358, Passive conditions 
r=0.232*, p=0.05; B. Active conditions r=0.177, p=0.139 Passive conditions r=0.259*, p= 0.029. 
Reprinted from When Passive Feels Active - Delusion-Proneness Alters Self-Recognition in the 
Moving Rubber Hand Illusion. Louzolo et al. PLOS ONE. 2015. 10(6).   
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to psychosis. Our results revealed a weak positive correlation with ASD tendency 
(r=0.192, p<0.001) and a moderate positive correlation with the ADHD trait (r=0.406, 
p<0.001) (Figure 12), and is thus confirming previous work pointing towards overlaps 
between psychotic disorders and ADHD/ASD (Dalsgaard et al. 2014; Stahlberg et al. 
2004; Larsson et al. 2013; Chisholm et al. 2015).  However, our study extends these 
finding to the associated traits. Similar correlations were found when analyses were 
conducted on the items that had been described as prototypical to the disorder they 
were assessing (PDI/AQ correlation r=0.129, p<0.001; PDI/ASRS correlation r=0.324, 
p<0.001) (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12. Correlations between PDI scores and AQ/ASRS scores on full (A and B) 
and truncated (C and D) versions of the questionnaires. 
A: Correlation between PDI scores and AQ scores – r = 0.192** 
B: Correlation between PDI scores and ASRS scores – r = 0.406** 
C: Correlation between PDI scores and AQ scores – r = 0.129** 
D: Correlation between PDI scores and ASRS scores – r = 0.324** 
** p<.001 two-tailed Spearman's correlations 
Reprinted from Delusion-proneness displays comorbidity with traits of autistic-spectrum 
disorders and ADHD. Louzolo et al. PLOS ONE. 2017. 12(5).   
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 In a second step we furthered the investigation in order to identify which particular 
ADHD/ASD dimensions were more related to psychosis tendencies by applying a factor 
analysis on our dataset. Our results revealed that the delusion-proneness factor  
correlated strongly with three ADHD factors (impulsivity, inattention, hyperactivity), 
and to a lesser with an ASD factors.  
 
Altogether, our results support the idea of the existence of subclinical symptoms, 
shared by psychosis-proneness and ASD- or ADHD-traits, in particular related to 
hyperactivity/impulsivity and communication. Our results do not allow drawing any 
conclusion in terms of causal relationship, or on whether these co-morbidities reflect 
shared underlying mechanisms. However, the idea of general shared mechanisms 
underlying different psychiatric disorders has been discussed extensively the last years 
(Caspi et al. 2014; Lahey et al. 2012) and it is possible that it may be mirrored in the 
relation between different subclinical traits. 
 
c. Study III 
 
In line with our hypothesis, Study III showed that delusion-prone individuals were 
more likely than controls to accept false feedback and display confabulation-associated 
behaviour when facing perceptual ambiguity.  
 
Overall, delusion-prone participants failed more often than controls to detect picture 
manipulations (t=2.088, df=40.351, p=0.021 one-tailed independent sample t-test on 
average detection rates) (Figure 13). In addition, they gave significantly more extreme 
preference ratings to those non-detected trials, than controls did (average rating 
delusion-prone group=35.20, SD=18.18; average rating control group=23.06, 
SD=10.77; independent sample t-test t=-2.959, df=48, p=0.005). This could not be 
explained by a general tendency to give more extreme ratings as there was no group 
difference on baseline ratings. Instead, this points towards a tendency of delusion-
prone individuals to be over-confident in the way they appraise their own preferences 
or performance. These observations mimic previous work on psychosis-related states 
repeatedly showing larger propensity to experience false recognition or bias against 
disconfirmatory evidence and to be overly confident in them (Joyce et al. 2013).  
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Interestingly, the difference 
between delusion-prone 
participants’ preference 
ratings on non-detected 
manipulations and 
detected/non-manipulated 
trials was comparable to the 
equivalent difference in 
control participants (Figure 
14). Preference ratings on 
non-detected 
manipulations compared to 
detected (absolute values) 
or non-manipulated 
preference ratings can be 
viewed as a proxy to 
subconscious uncertainty in 
the face of perceptual 
ambiguity. The smaller the 
non-detected ratings are (as compared to the two other preference ratings), the more 
uncertain the participant is. Our results thus suggest that while delusion-prone 
individuals were more impaired in conscious error detection, at the subconscious level 
they seemed to experience a degree of uncertainty when facing ambiguous stimuli that 
was similar to controls. 
 
Finally, we also observed a time effect on detection rates that was similar in both 
groups. Namely, all participants improved their detection rate with time (time effect 
F(1,48)=62.687, p<0.001 – (time x group) repeated-measure general linear model). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Detection rates. Overall detection rate in the 
control group (mean=0.38, SD=0.26) and delusion-prone 
group (mean=0.24, SD=0.18). The group difference was 
significant (t=2.088, df=40.351, p=0.021 one-tailed). 
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d. Study IV 
 
Our main hypothesis, stating that instructions would have a larger effect on delusion-
prone participants than on controls, was confirmed by our results showing a 
significantly larger general effect of instructions on fear index scores in the delusion-
prone group (t=-2.081, df=41, p=0.022, one-tailed) (Figure 15 B). This result brings 
supporting evidence to the idea that delusion-proneness is associated with a larger top-
down influence of high-order beliefs. Interestingly, when explicitly asked to rate to 
what extent they felt they have been influenced by the written instructions, delusion-
prone participants also reported a higher influence level. When the same question was 
Figure 14. Mean preference ratings on detected trials, non-detected manipulations 
and non-manipulated trials. In the control group, non-detected trials were rated 
significantly lower than detected trials (absolute value; paired t-test t=4.306, df=33, 
p<0.001) and non-manipulated trials (paired t-test t=6.758, df=33, p<0.001). In the 
delusion-prone group, non-detected trials were also rated significantly lower than 
detected-trials (absolute value; paired t-test t=2.248, df=12, p=0.044) and this difference 
was on the border of significance in case of non-manipulated trials (paired t-test t=2.066, 
df=15, p=0.057). There was no group interaction when comparing non-detected trials and 
detected manipulations (repeated-measure model F=19.485, df=45, p=0.702) or non-
detected trials and non-manipulated trials (repeated-measure model F=27.637, df=48, 
p=0.628) 
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asked regarding the influence of shocks, no group difference was observed. This, too, 
advocates for a larger effect of explicit high-order signals. Moreover, in the delusion-
prone group, both implicit and explicit ratings of the effects of instructions (index 
scores and explicit ratings, respectively) correlated positively with distress. This speaks 
towards a relation between the level of distress associated with delusions and the top-
down influence of high-order beliefs. This observation is especially interesting in light 
of studies that identified distress as the main factor differentiating psychosis-prone 
individuals from clinical populations, in terms of delusional ideation (Peters, Day, et al. 
1999; Lim et al. 2011; Lim et al. 2014; Cella et al. 2012). Our results thus add to the body 
of evidence stressing the importance of distress in delusion-proneness, and arguing for 
taking this dimension into greater account when studying psychosis-related states.  
 
During extinction, repeated exposures to CS+ without any UCS pairing gradually 
eliminate the physiological fear response (Sehlmeyer et al. 2009). However when it 
comes to evaluative conditioning, a resistance to extinction is commonly reported 
(Gawronski et al. 2015). In line with this, both groups showed resistance to extinction 
in the context of the instructed CS. Interestingly, while the control group displayed a 
trend towards an extinction effect (t=1.63, df=22, p=0.059, one-tailed paired t-test), fear 
learning (represented by fear index scores) seemed to increase after extinction in the 
delusion-prone group (t=-1.78 p=0.09 two-tailed, paired t-test) yielding a significant 
interaction (t=2.339, df=41, p=0.024). In other words, instead of becoming more 
neutral in their judgement regarding the faces, delusion-prone individuals turned even 
more extreme in their ratings (Figure 15). 
 
In terms of brain activity, fear conditioning led to activation in brain areas commonly 
reported in conditioning in both groups (Fullana et al. 2015). In line with our 
hypothesis, instructions activated the lOfc (Figure 16). Although this activation pattern 
was mainly driven by delusion-prone subjects (that was the only group showing a 
significant bilateral activation in lOfc bilaterally), there was no significant group 
difference. When studying functional connectivity associated with the general effect of 
instructions, the PPI analysis revealed increased connectivity between right lOfc and 
right posterior insula (Z=3.29, corrected p=0.004) specifically in delusion-prone 
individuals. Posterior insula is considered one of the primary nociceptive input regions. 
Thus the increased association observed between this region and lOfc in the instruction 
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contrasts mirrors the previously reported increased influence of intermediate/high-
level priors in lObc on sensory processing in delusion-prone individuals (Schmack et al. 
2013). Moreover, the PPI analysis suggested that the connectivity between lOfc and 
cACC was significantly increased in delusion-prone participants compared to controls, 
Figure 15. Explicit behavioural responses to instructed learning. (A) Timeline of 
likability ratings for instructed CS after instructions, acquisition and extinction phases. (B) 
Overall instructed fear index scores (averaged over 3 phases) are significantly larger in the 
delusion-prone group (mean=125.77, SD=93.06) than in the control group (mean=74.50, 
SD=67.98 – independent-sample t-test t=-2.081, df=41, p=0.022, one-tailed). (C) No 
extinction effect for the instructed stimuli when comparing fear index scores before and 
after the extinction phase (T2 and T3) for any of the groups (delusion-prone group:                 
t=-0.048, df=19, p=0.96, paired t-test; control group: t=1.04, df=22, p=0.31, paired t-test) 
nor any group x phase interaction (t=0.872, df=41, p=0.388). (D) Significant interaction 
between the groups on the extinction effect for the non-instructed stimulus pairs (t=2.339, 
df=41, p=0.024). While the control group tended to show a significant extinction (t=1.63, 
df=22, p=0.059 one-tailed paired t-test), the delusion-prone group tended to show an 
opposite effect, i.e. increased fear index score after extinction (t=-1.78 p=0.09), when the 
two groups were examined separately. INST: instruction phase, ACQ: acquisition phase, 
EXT: extinction phase, T0 to T3 see Figure 8 
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when investigating how instructions specifically influenced fear conditioning (Z=2.96, 
corrected p=0.012). 
 
Our results revealed a group differences in terms of functional connectivity between 
lOfc and pain/fear processing areas, and not in activation levels. This implies that, in 
delusion-prone individuals, high-level priors do not necessarily lead to modified 
activity, but instead, they change the way specific brain regions interact. Our results are 
in line with previous work suggesting the involvement of lOfc in re-appraisal (Wager et 
al. 2008) and placebo analgesia (Petrovic et al. 2005; Krummenacher, Candia, et al. 
2010; Petrovic et al. 2010). Moreover, research suggests a role for orbito-frontal cortex 
in top-down facilitation in visual object recognition (Bar 2003). More precisely, orbito-
frontal cortex is presented as a potential source of top-down predictions helping speed 
up object recognition processes (Bar 2003). Finally, and similarly to our results, 
functional connectivity between lOfc and sensory processing areas was also associated 
with delusion-proneness, in a conditioned visual illusion paradigm (Schmack et al. 
2013).   
 
In summary, our study together with existing literature, bring supporting evidence to a 
larger top-down influence of high-order beliefs in delusion-proneness.  In addition, our 
result also confirm an involvement of lOfc in the generation of high-order priors, and 
point towards an increased top-down influence from lOfc on primary sensory areas, 
associated with delusion-proneness.  
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Figure 16. BOLD response (A) and functional connectivity analyses (B & C). (A) The main 
effect of instructions showed a bilateral activation in lOfc, which was mainly driven by the 
delusion-prone group (there was no tendency of lOfc activation at the present threshold for 
the control group, while the lOfc activation was highly significant and bilateral for the 
delusion-prone group). In addition, delusion-prone individuals also displayed activation in 
vmPFC that was not reported in the control group, nor in the all-subject activations. (B) A PPI 
analysis of the effect of Instructions revealed increased connectivity between right lOfc and 
functionally defined low-level pain processing areas (i.e. right posterior insula), specifically 
for delusion-prone individuals (Z = 3.29, corrected p = 0.004). (C) A PPI analysis of the effects 
of instruction on fear processing showed a significantly larger connectivity between lOfc and 
cACC, overlapping with fear related activation, in delusion-prone than in control participants 
(Z = 2.96, corrected p = 0.012). 
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V – Discussion  
 
The work presented in this thesis helps to further the understanding of unusual 
experiences reported in psychosis-related states. The central picture emerging from 
our studies, and in line with previous work, is that delusion-proneness is associated 
with disrupted experiences, ranging from self-recognition to beliefs, as well as an 
altered decision-making. In psychosis-related states, the experience of the world and of 
the self is imprecise and fluctuates. From a predictive coding perspective, these 
impairments have commonly been explained by poor precision and instability of the 
low-level prediction system. However, as described earlier, this hypothesis is puzzling 
in light of the phenomenon of delusions (i.e. overly stable high-level beliefs). Our 
research was thus conceived as an attempt to disentangle the role of low- and high-
levels of the processing hierarchy in delusion-proneness, and to reconcile the two sides 
of this paradox.  
 
a. Low-level prediction systems 
 
Study I and III were designed to tap onto low and intermediate levels of the processing 
hierarchy, with paradigms that pertained to different cognitive domains, in order to be 
representative of a few of the impairments observed in schizophrenia: Study I targeted 
self-recognition, while Study III targeted decision making and confabulations. Our 
results confirmed the weak and unstable nature of low-level priors in delusion-prone 
individuals manifested in a blurred experience of the self and a liberal acceptance bias 
in this group of subjects.  
 
In a context where low-level priors are based on external input, they have to be built in 
a bottom-up fashion (Friston 2005). These priors are then used to process new 
incoming information. However, delusion-prone individuals and psychosis patients fail 
to create stable low-level priors, possibly due to the aberrant (or hyper-) salience bias, 
whereby stimuli are wrongly attributed salience (Kapur 2003), which might be related 
to an over-responsive dopamine system (Weinstein et al. 2017; Abi-Dargham et al. 
2004; Woodward et al. 2011; Egerton et al. 2013; Fusar-Poli et al. 2011; Howes et al. 
2009). Every time a new incoming signal appears, it generates a prior that overwrites 
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existing ones, which does not allow constructions of stable priors in these hierarchies. 
As mentioned earlier, a prime example of this, is altered mismatch negativity displayed 
by schizophrenia individuals in oddball studies (Javitt et al. 1998; Javitt et al. 1993). 
Such studies focus on changes in brain activity when a new input appears amidst an 
otherwise continuous repetitive sequence of a stimulus. While control participants 
successfully detect the deviant signal thanks to a transient memory trace they acquired 
about the repeated stimulus that acts as a low-level prior, schizophrenia and at-risk 
participants fail to create such priors which limits their detection abilities (Javitt et al. 
1998; Javitt et al. 1993; Atkinson et al. 2012; Brockhaus-Dumke et al. 2005). Other tasks 
such as prepulse inhibition (Swerdlow et al. 2006; Javitt & Freedman 2015; Braff et al. 
1992) and perceptual stability in the random dot kinetogram (RDK) illusion (Schmack 
et al. 2013) also suggest weak low-level priors in psychosis related states. We suggest 
that delusion-prone subjects failed to detect manipulated faces in the choice-blindness 
paradigm (Study III) due to their inability to form an initial reliable prior, combined 
with a tendency to give new stimuli too much salience, i.e. they regarded the displayed 
non-chosen face as too salient to dismiss. Importantly, this effect was not due to a 
difference in general working memory capacity. Thus, the problem is not working 
memory per se but building priors based on new and overly salient input. 
 
Impairments in low-level priors are not limited to external input. Studies on self-
induced touch (Blakemore, Wolpert, et al. 2000) and force matching (Shergill et al. 
2005) suggest that also internally generated priors are imprecise in psychosis related 
states. Based on our results from Study I we argue that since delusion-prone individuals 
and patients with psychosis also show difficulties to build precise low-level priors when 
expectations are internally generated (i.e. efference copy), they need to rely on 
incoming signals in order to build sense of agency. Thus, it may be suggested that the 
perceptions of psychosis patients and delusion-prone individuals are biased towards 
the input they receive both in the case of externally generated and internally generated 
priors.  
 
A way to conceptualise this, is that in the absence of existing higher-level priors or 
reliable self-generated low-level priors, it seems schizophrenia patients, and to a lesser 
extent psychosis-prone individuals, perceive the world moment-to-moment, and their 
experience of the world is actually closer to what the environment is like at a given time, 
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than in control subjects. This is echoed in findings with the force-matching task (Shergill 
et al. 2005; Teufel et al. 2010). The suggestion that patients with psychosis and 
delusion-prone subjects do not take into consideration the temporal history of a 
situation as much as controls, and mainly focus on the present time, may also relate to 
the jumping-to-conclusion bias. These studies have suggested that schizophrenia 
patients experience difficulties in incorporating prior evidence in their decision 
strategy and show a recency effect and hasty decisions (Evans et al. 2015; Garety et al. 
1991; Moritz & Woodward 2005; Joyce et al. 2013).  
 
b. High-level prediction system  
 
Contrary to weak low-level priors, the presence of delusions suggests that high-level 
priors have unusual high precision in psychosis-related states. Two recent studies 
brought some experimental data supporting this argument (Schmack et al. 2013; Teufel 
et al. 2015). Those studies used paradigms in which participants had to make sense of 
ambiguous stimuli. Schmack and colleagues used the RDK paradigm where participants 
were presented with moving dots on a screen (Schmack et al. 2013). The task was to 
identify in which direction the dots were moving - which actually is an illusionary effect 
of the RDK. After being tricked into believing that the googles the experimenter gave 
them had influence over the motion direction of the dots, participants were tested on 
moving dots where the experienced direction normally is ambiguous and jumps 
between left and right. The study suggested that delusion-prone individuals relied 
extensively on their expectations (i.e. the googles affected the motion direction) to 
make sense of their ambiguous perceptions, as compared to non-delusion-prone 
subjects.  
 
In Teufel’s study (Teufel et al. 2015), two-tone images that looked like random black 
and white patches in the absence of appropriate prior information were first presented 
to participants. After this presentation, the colour templates of the two-tone images 
depicting natural scenes with people were shown. Finally, the same black and white 
pictures as initially presented were shown once again. In the two-tone blocks, 
participants were required to indicate whether a person was present on each picture. 
Similar to Schmack’s study, the hypothesis was that patients and delusion-prone 
individuals would make a greater use of their prior knowledge (the unambiguous 
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colour templates) in order to make sense of the two-tone images. Also, this study 
showed that delusion-prone individuals (and psychosis patients) relied more strongly 
on top-down signals in order to disambiguate the presented stimuli (Schmack et al. 
2013; Teufel et al. 2015). 
 
Study IV confirms and extends these observations by suggesting that stronger top-
down influence of beliefs observed in delusion-prone individuals is not limited to 
sensory perception, but may also apply to complex processes, like evaluative fear 
learning. In contrast to the two other studies, our design made it also possible to show 
that delusion-prone participants already had formed more strong beliefs before the 
reinforcing sensory evidence (i.e. after the presentation of instructions). We argue that 
this finding extends the idea by Kapur (Kapur 2003), i.e. that overly strong beliefs are 
formed in order to explain specific aberrant stimuli, to that this effects also may 
represent a coping strategy in order to better understand a noisy low-level perception. 
 
Our fMRI results from the same study showed an activation of lOfc in the main effect of 
instructions and a stronger functional connectivity between lOfc and structures 
processing fear and pain in the delusion-prone group. As lOfc is involved in cognitive 
reappraisal (Wager et al. 2008; Golkar et al. 2012; Eippert et al. 2007) our findings 
support the idea that delusion-prone subjects actually use higher order priors to better 
understand the input as a coping strategy. It has also been suggested that lOfc is a key 
structure in the placebo effect in which higher-order expectations (or priors) are given 
to subjects and patients leading to a changed experience of pain or unpleasantness 
(Petrovic et al. 2002; Petrovic et al. 2005; Petrovic et al. 2010; Wager & Atlas 2015). 
Additionally, it was also proposed that delusion-proneness was associated with an 
involvement of lOfc in mediating belief-congruent information in visual processing in 
the RDK illusion (Schmack et al. 2013). Thus, our data suggest that overly strong beliefs 
are formed, not only as a direct consequence of understanding specific aberrant input 
(Kapur 2003), but also as a way to  better understand a generally noisy environment 
using available higher order information. 
 
Our results also mirror the jumping-to-conclusion bias and bias against 
disconfirmatory evidence that were reported in schizophrenia patients, on a task 
involving the generation of high-order beliefs (Veckenstedt et al. 2011). In line with this 
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study, our results suggest that our delusion-prone participants required much less 
evidence in order to assume a statement was true, update their model of the world 
accordingly and stick to that view. However, this idea still does not explain why the 
high-level models are more stable than the low-level models in psychosis-related states.  
 
c. The search for a meaning 
 
As discussed previously, it has been suggested that due to the aberrant salience 
attribution bias, many signals that should have been ignored become highly relevant 
(Kapur 2003). This results in experiences that can hardly be explained in a fast, 
automatic way. Thus, while psychotic and delusion-prone individuals fail to create 
stable low-level priors, they keep on being bombarded by aberrant input. Accumulation 
of the resulting unresolved errors may generate a feeling of uncertainty and a need for 
closure (McKay et al. 2006; Colbert & Peters 2002). It has been further suggested that 
in order to get rid of this uneasy feeling, more cognitively advanced processes and 
explicit reasoning strategies are required (Kapur 2003). The brain thus attempts to 
make sense out of signals that are unrelated and irrelevant to the current situation. As 
a result,  erroneous (high-level) causal inferences are generated (Kapur 2003).  
 
Apart from experimental studies in delusion-prone subjects discussed above (Schmack 
et al. 2013; Teufel et al. 2015), the urge to explain away sensory signals on a higher and 
more abstract level, was suggested in studies investigating paranormal beliefs. These 
studies reported a larger inclination to find meaningful patterns in visual noise in 
paranormal believers (Brugger et al. 1993; Riekki et al. 2013; Blackmore & Moore 1994; 
Gianotti et al. 2001). In contrast to the studies on delusion-prone participants, these 
subjects were not provided with any specific higher-order information. 
 
We initially hypothesised in Study IV that delusion-prone subjects would show less fear 
learning in the non-instructed condition, than the control subjects - mirroring previous 
studies on classical conditioning and psychosis-related states (Balog et al. 2013; Holt et 
al. 2012; Holt et al. 2009; Jensen et al. 2008; Romaniuk et al. 2010). However, we did 
not observe any difference between the groups in this condition, and we did not observe 
any significant difference between the instructed and non-instructed condition in the 
delusion-prone group. The bias towards actively seeking meaning in incoming signals, 
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discussed in the previous paragraph, might underlie the absence of difference between 
instructed and non-instructed CS in delusion-prone individuals. Both instructed and 
non-instructed CS were presented at the same time. Thus, the instructions for the 
instructed CS might have prompted psychosis-prone individuals to look for special 
meaning in the non-instructed CS too, rendering them more similar to instructed CS in 
terms of contingency expectation. The combination of seeking for a meaning (as 
suggested by the initial given instructions for instructed CS) and the association with a 
aversive stimulation might have induced a more substantial learning than in a classical 
fear conditioning study where no information about possible contingencies is given at 
the start.  
 
The need to look for meaning in all sorts of perceived objects might also relate to the 
fact psychosis-like experiences cannot be understood based on rational and commonly 
accepted explanations provided by the individual’s culture. This is probably one of the 
reasons why those individuals tend to be interested in paranormal beliefs. By definition, 
the existence of paranormal phenomena is viewed by society as beyond normal 
experience or scientific explanation. Paranormal beliefs provide explanations to 
phenomena society fails to justify, similar to the way schizophrenia patients might feel 
about their experiences. While psychosis patients’ own society marginalises them, and 
somewhat discredits the authenticity of their weird experiences by telling them these 
are “tricks of their brain”, paranormal ideology is inclusive – it does not view psychotic 
individuals as ill – and gives credit to these unsettling perceptions by describing them 
as real. Paranormal beliefs, with their alternative and unconventional description of the 
world, provide individuals in psychosis-related states with readily available 
explanations that fit their strange experiences (something their own culture failed to 
achieve). Thus, psychotic or psychosis-prone individuals may be actively seeking 
information on paranormal topics as a more effective and less demanding way to 
attenuate the general confusion their unusual experiences generate. This is in line with 
both the idea we developed in Study IV and Kapur’s description of delusion formation 
as an adaptive mechanism to aberrant salience (Kapur 2003). 
 
In line with this idea, Study IV not only confirmed the larger influence of high-order 
instructions on delusion-prone individuals, but it also showed that those individuals 
integrated more readily externally generated complex (i.e. social) information that 
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would influence their belief system. Earlier work suggested that delusions were a 
response mechanism to aberrant salience attribution (Kapur 2003). Psychotic 
individuals would thus only fabricate those stories or beliefs after they had experienced 
those strange sensory phenomena, as a way to resolve the associated PEs. While not 
negating this theory, we extend it by proposing that delusion-prone individuals actively 
look for elements allowing them to generate those overly strong higher-order beliefs 
even in the absence of a specific aberrant sensory phenomenon. As mentioned 
previously, the vast majority of daily sensory processing happens at an automatic, non-
conscious level. This is the case with background noise for instance. Conscious PE 
resolution usually occurs as a last resort, when the cognitive dissonance is too large to 
be resolved at a lower level. While non-conscious PE minimising can be seen as the 
default system in control individuals, we argue that due to the lack of reliable low-level 
prediction system, individuals are in a state of constant diffuse cognitive dissonance, 
leading them to use high-order level processing as their primary processing strategy. It 
is important to keep in mind that characteristic perceptual aberrations like 
hallucinations are not the only unsettling experiences that psychotic patients or 
psychosis-prone have. They also go through a whole range of more abstract sensations 
or feelings they can hardly verbalise. In the prodromal phase, they often describe being 
beset by feelings of a profound change, by the sense that something important is about 
to occur, without actually being able to pinpoint what exactly (Parnas & Handest 2003). 
Patients may experience some sort of "inner void" or "lack of inner nucleus" (Parnas & 
Handest 2003), or reflect on self-evident daily matters and get stuck on rumination 
loops due to failure to let things pass by (Parnas & Handest 2003). Those experiences 
can hardly be linked to one specific event. They rather correspond to a general sense of 
perplexity, related to hyper-reflexivity (Pérez-Álvarez et al. 2016; Sass & Parnas 2003). 
When viewing psychosis or psychosis-proneness in such a light, it then makes sense to 
postulate the existence of a bias towards a constant and proactive search and 
integration of higher order information/belief, in psychosis-related states, rather than 
viewing delusions as a mere consequence of aberrantly salient input (Kapur 2003). 
 
d. Limitations 
 
A main limitation that was present in all our studies (except Study II) was the small size 
of our samples and the fact we only reached moderately high average PDI scores in our 
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delusion-prone groups. Ideally, in order to have a more complete understanding of 
psychosis, it would be best to study the whole spectrum or stratify the spectrum into 
several sub-groups. This would help get a clearer picture of the different aspects of 
delusion-proneness. The average PDI yes/no score on a population bases is 
approximately 6.7 (out of 21) (Peters et al. 2004).  A score of 8 or 9 is commonly 
accepted as a reliable cut-off criterion differentiating high delusion-proneness from low 
delusion-proneness (Green et al. 2001; Preti et al. 2007; So & Kwok 2015). However, it 
is fair to assume someone scoring 9 on PDI is probably very different in terms of 
delusion-proneness than someone scoring 16. Nevertheless, so far in all studies 
working with psychosis tendencies, these two participants would be pooled in the same 
group and considered equal. Ideally, having a dimensional approach and study the 
whole spectrum without categorising participants would give a more accurate 
perspective. This is the approach we used in Study I, but due to the skewed distribution 
of PDI in the general population, participants with high scores were largely under-
represented compared to low scores. Such a situation thus makes it difficult to identify 
behaviours or response patterns that are characteristic of psychosis or psychosis-
related states. An alternative option would be to include a control group and a delusion-
prone group - with the latter being better defined. Nevertheless, the issue with finding 
enough participants would be the same, as exemplified in Study IV, in which we had to 
screen 925 persons in order to include a total of 22 healthy male individuals in the final 
sample (scoring above 11 on PDI, and devoid of ADHD- or ASD-tendencies). Another 
idea would be to improve the characterisation of psychosis-prone individuals by adding 
other delusion-related questionnaires, and combining them with some psychosis 
biomarkers (including polygenic risk scores for schizophrenia). Another problem with 
self-report questionnaires like PDI is that they are subjective and susceptible to 
interpretation biases, lack of cognitive insight, etc. Thus, the use of biomarkers 
represents a useful addition to psychosis-proneness definition as they allow assessing 
some other psychosis-related features in a more objective way. Finally, the present 
studies have to be performed in psychosis patients as well to understand whether the 
findings generalize to clinical phenotypes, as has been done previously (Teufel et al. 
2015). 
 
A limitation related to Study III was the fact that unlike the original study where 
participants were asked to elaborate on the reasons behind their choice, here 
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confabulation was only measured indirectly by the negative preference ratings. This 
verbal reporting was removed due to technical limitations in our setting. However 
bringing back this part of the original paradigm (either through verbal or written 
report) would provide a more detailed account of confabulations. 
 
As for Study IV, the main limitation was the fact the non-instructed condition failed to 
be a fully reliable control condition. Compared to classical conditioning paradigms in 
which participants are not being given any explicit instructions about the pairing of 
unconditioned and conditioned stimuli, in our paradigm, the non-instructed faces were 
presented at the same time as the instructed stimuli. Thus, the effect of instructions (in 
particular the negative one) on participants’ judgments was translated on the non-
instructed faces as well. During the debriefing session following the experiment, a large 
number of participants actually reported that after the instruction phase, they expected 
at least of one the two non-instructed faces to give them shocks. This suggests that 
unlike our initial thought when constructing the paradigm, the non-instructed faces 
were not purely non-instructed. This was also in line with the absence of a significant 
fear index score difference between those two conditions after the acquisition phase. 
Surprisingly, while participants indicated that that had built some priors about the non-
instructed faces following the instruction phase, this did not actually translate into their 
ratings, as there was no difference in the non-instructed fear index scores before and 
after the instruction phase. One could speculate that the prior that was built regarding 
the non-instructed faces was low in precision as it solely indicated that one face would 
most likely give shocks, however both faces were equally susceptible to be the shock 
one. Therefore, although there was an existing prior, it was too imprecise to bias the 
ratings. However, the expectation stating that one of the non-instructed faces was going 
to give them shocks combined with the presence of shocks during the acquisition phase 
(confirmatory evidence), probably led to a stronger reappraisal of the non-instructed 
faces in psychosis-prone individuals.  
 
e. Future directions 
 
The four studies presented in this thesis confirmed the usefulness of studying 
psychosis-proneness when trying to understand mechanisms behind psychosis. 
Despite being healthy and thus not subjected to medication effects, delusion-prone 
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individuals show behavioural and cognitive resemblances to patients. As suggested in 
our different studies, psychosis-prone individuals differ significantly from controls in a 
variety of behavioural responses and brain activity patterns. The work gathered here, 
therefore argues for more studies taking into account psychosis-proneness and not only 
focusing on clinical states. Studies using both patients and delusion-prone groups 
would greatly help the field move forward. Study II also brings further evidence 
regarding the existence of overlaps between psychosis-proneness and other 
neurodevelopmental disorders like ADHD. This stresses the importance of assessing 
these tendencies when studying psychosis-related states in order to avoid describing 
behaviours that actually pertain to ADHD or ASD symptomatology as specifically 
psychosis-related. 
 
1. Choice blindness 
 
A challenging aspect in the paradigm used in Study III is the fact that, although it is fairly 
reasonable to consider the task taps onto the low end of the processing hierarchy, it is 
not clear to what extent the instruction/training session (only containing non-
manipulated trials) represent an instruction phase, leading participants to create an 
explicit belief (high-level prior) about the paradigm; i.e. the picture that reappears is 
(unquestionably) the one on which she/he clicked. Consequently, it is hard to draw a 
clear conclusion on the results, since part of the observations might be due to a larger 
top-down effect of this high-order belief in delusion-prone individuals. The belief that 
they have full control over the task, thus meaning the picture they see has to be the one 
they selected, would thus overwrite the incoming stimulus. Removing the training 
session could help limit the probability of unwanted induction of beliefs and would 
allow focusing on low-level processes. Considering the task is quite self-explanatory, 
removing the training part would not affect the understanding the rules of the 
paradigm.  
 
An interesting way to move forward with the choice blindness paradigm would be to 
look separately at the two levels and show a double dissociation in terms of behaviours, 
depending on which level is targeted (similar to Study IV). This could be achieved by 
having the first two groups (delusion–prone group 1 and control group 1) go through 
the same paradigm as in Study III (without training). There, the focus would be on low-
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level processes. The two other groups (delusion-prone group 2 and control group 2), 
participants would be explicitly informed that in this part, a significant number of trials 
would be manipulated, while in practise none would be. There, the effect of high-level 
beliefs on lower level processes would be investigated. In line with our results in Study 
III, we would expect delusion-prone participants to detect fewer manipulations than 
controls in the first part. However, the larger effect of high-level top-down regulation 
associated with psychosis-proneness would lead delusion-prone participants to be 
more inclined than controls to report false detections in the second part. 
 
In addition, as discussed previously, it would be of great interest to investigate whether 
confabulations related to the non-detected manipulated trials differ in frequency, 
length and vividness between delusion-prone subjects and controls. This can be done 
using an automatic linguistic analysis of the verbal responses given by the subjects.  
Finally, formal models of decision-making could be applied to the paradigm. 
 
2. Instructed learning 
 
An appealing aspect of the instructed learning paradigm is the fact it induces delusion-
like beliefs pertaining to social interactions, which thus mimic some aspects of paranoid 
delusions, like persecutory ideation. Paranoid beliefs are some of the most common 
symptoms in schizophrenia (Freeman 2007; Insel 2010). They are the consequence of 
dysfunctional advanced reasoning processes such as causal inference or mentalising, 
resulting in misjudgement of other people’s intentions towards oneself. Studying the 
formation of paranoid beliefs may help understand which high-level mechanisms are 
compromised in psychosis.  
 
Similar to other kinds of delusion, persecutory ideation is often associated with belief 
inflexibility. Study IV pointed slightly towards this idea when reporting delusion-prone 
individuals not only showed resistance to extinction but they actually tended to display 
reinforced judgement following this phase. This aspect could be further investigated 
with this paradigm, in order to mirror results in studies showing BADE and jumping-
to-conclusion bias in schizophrenia (Buchy et al. 2007; Woodward et al. 2006; 
Eisenacher & Zink 2016), but using a more ecological model. In Study IV, these two 
kinds of information about UCS contingencies (bottom-up sensory input and top-down 
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high-order belief) were congruent. If one assumes that the weight of high-level priors 
is much larger than the weight of low-level expectations in delusion-prone individuals, 
then high-level top-down signals may overwrite weak incoming sensory input when 
facing contradictory information, mirroring the BADE phenomenon (Buchy et al. 2007; 
Eisenacher & Zink 2016; Veckenstedt et al. 2011). This hypothesis could be tested with 
the instructed learning paradigm, by inverting the contingencies of the instructed CS. 
Namely, the instructed CS- (presented as a virtuous person) would actually turn out to 
be the one associated with shocks, while the instructed CS+ (presented as a threatening 
person) would not be paired with shocks. This version of the paradigm would be 
somewhat similar to a recent study, where the delusion-proneness was not investigated 
(Atlas et al. 2016). Introducing an online monitoring of the likability for the 4 CS would 
allow to follow and model the dynamic changes in participants’ judgment. According to 
our hypothesis we would expect delusion-prone individuals to stick longer to their 
initial judgement (i.e. more negative ratings to the initial instructed CS+ and more 
positive ratings to the initial instructed CS-), while controls would reverse their 
judgement more rapidly.  
 
The instructed learning paradigm explored the high-versus-low dissociation in the 
context of negative emotions. However it would also be interesting to study this 
imbalance between high and low-levels in positive emotions and reward framework 
too, especially considering the central role dopamine plays in reward processing 
(Schultz 2016). Nevertheless, reward processing and experience depend largely on the 
value people attribute to stimuli and can thus vary greatly across individuals, which 
may make it difficult to successfully implement a paradigm on reward in an 
experimental setting. This might partly explain contradicting results suggesting for 
instance impaired positive emotion processing in schizophrenia (Herbener et al. 2007) 
whereas others only noted biases towards negative emotional stimuli (Kohler et al. 
2003), or some reporting reduced experience of reward and motivation (Fervaha et al. 
2017; Fervaha et al. 2015). These contradictory observations speak towards the need 
of studies using more ecological reward paradigms, in which different processing levels 
could be targeted, similar to our instructed learning experiment. 
 
Another aspect that deserves a greater attention and the notion of confidence displayed 
by individuals in psychosis-related states. Previous work has shown patients with 
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schizophrenia were not only more prone to making wrong decision or perceptual 
mistakes, but they were also often more confident in their performance than control 
participants (Joyce et al. 2013; Moritz et al. 2005; Moritz et al. 2014; Jardri & Denève 
2013; Buchy et al. 2009). It is commonly suggested that such an overconfidence bias 
probably plays a role in the maintenance of delusions even in the face of contradicting 
information. In Study III we only touched upon this aspect, using preference ratings as 
a proxy to uncertainty, but future studies should integrate this dimension more 
precisely. Adding metacognitive tasks (Fleming & Lau 2014; Fleming et al. 2012) in 
order to evaluate participants’ cognitive insight would be a useful complement to 
psychosis-proneness assessment.  
 
Finally, another interesting aspect to consider for future studies, and in particular the 
instructed learning and choice blindness paradigms, would be to adopt a more 
computational perspective on the behavioural and functional imaging analyses. 
Computational models have been used to better describe reward learning (Pessiglione 
et al. 2006) as well as instructed fear learning paradigms (Atlas et al. 2016). Especially, 
it would be interesting to study multi-level predictive coding using models such as  
hierarchical Gaussian filter (Powers et al. 2017). Such models have recently been 
implemented in experimental studies of psychosis (Powers et al. 2017; Schmack et al. 
2016). This would help capture more complex aspects of the different mechanisms 
involved in the psychosis-related behaviours we aim to understand. 
 
3. Pharmacological manipulations 
 
Another interesting future direction would be to combine the paradigms we have 
designed with pharmacological manipulations. The role of dopamine in salience 
attribution makes the use of dopamine agonists very interesting in that context. In line 
with the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia (Howes & Kapur 2009), one could test 
whether the use of dopamine agonists could reproduce in non-delusion-prone 
individuals, the findings observed in delusion-prone participants. For instance one 
could hypothesise a dopamine agonist would lead to a decreased manipulation 
detection rate in the choice blindness paradigm or a larger effect of instructions. 
 
The NMDA-R system also appears as another interesting target. Due to the slow 
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dynamics of NMDA-R it is proposed that these receptors are mainly involved in 
representing high-level top-down predictions, while the rapid AMPA-R 
neurotransmission seem more appropriate to the specification of prediction errors 
(bottom-up processes) (Corlett et al. 2011; Friston 2005). Together with the 
involvement of NMDA-R in the generation of transient memory traces used to predict 
incoming stimuli (Javitt et al. 1998; Javitt et al. 1993; Atkinson et al. 2012; Brockhaus-
Dumke et al. 2005) it seems NMDA-R are involved in top-down signalling in all levels of 
the processing hierarchy. It would therefore be interesting to test whether ketamine 
administration in healthy low-delusion-prone individuals would also lead to decreased 
detection rate in choice blindness or an increased influence of instructions on fear 
learning, mimicking the results we reported in delusion-proneness in Study III and 
Study IV.   
 
f. Conclusion 
 
We believe the four studies presented here contribute to the advancement of the field 
by bringing novel supporting evidence to the hypothesis of a co-existence of impaired 
unstable low-level processing systems and overly strong high-level expectations in 
psychosis-related state. Using paradigms that allowed us to investigate different 
cognitive domains (self-recognition, decision making, fear learning and social 
judgment), we reliably demonstrated that when facing perceptual ambiguity, delusion-
prone individuals compensated their lack of a reliable low-level expectation system 
either with aberrantly salient bottom-up sensory input (Study I and III), or by relying 
on overly strong beliefs, once those were successfully induced (Study IV). 
 
More importantly, we further this idea by showing that the increased top-down 
influence of those higher-order beliefs was not simply a secondary mechanism. Instead, 
we argue it actually represents a proactive strategy for individuals in psychosis-related 
states, to make sense of the noisy environment in which they are living. These 
individuals are constantly seeking new high-order beliefs to integrate in their models 
of the world in order to reduce this persistent feeling of cognitive dissonance. 
 
In addition to offering interesting results, the four studies presented here should be 
viewed as a starting point, opening to more studies. More than testing and bringing 
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support to our hypotheses, our work raised new questions that require further 
investigations, building on our results and the optimisation of our paradigms.  
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